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Fenceposts Without a Fence
Katherine E. Di Lucido, Nicholas K. Tabor & Jeffery Y. Zhang*
August 28, 2022
Abstract
Banking organizations in the United States have long been subject to
two broad categories of regulatory requirements. The first is
permissive: a “positive” grant of rights and privileges, typically via a
charter for a corporate entity, to engage in the business of banking.
The second is restrictive: a “negative” set of conditions on those rights
and privileges, limiting conduct and imposing a program of oversight
and enforcement, by which the holder of that charter must abide.
Together, these requirements form a legal cordon, or “regulatory
perimeter,” around the U.S. banking sector.
The regulatory perimeter figures prominently in several ongoing
policy debates, from the treatment of stablecoins and other cryptoassets, to the role of Big Tech in finance. However, the perimeter itself
is ill-defined and often misunderstood. To clarify it, this Article
situates the regulatory perimeter in the longer historical arc of
American banking, from the colonial era to the present. This Article
identifies a new pattern behind changes to the nature, shape, and
position of the perimeter—from outside-in pressure, to inside-out
pressure, to reform and expansion. The Article also pinpoints a shift,
decades old but previously neglected, in the design of regulatory
categories and the distribution of responsibility between Congress and
the executive branch. Put together, these trends have created a
regulatory perimeter that is broader, more complex, and arguably
more permeable than at any point in its history—fenceposts without
a fence.
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Introduction
The United States and countries around the world have seen the
recent proliferation of “FinTech” competitors to banking
organizations, which traditionally engage in the three bundled
activities of taking deposits, making loans, and facilitating payments.1
Consider the following competitors: Stablecoins like Tether or USD
Coin act as a deposit substitute that also can be used for payments.2
Plaid operates closer to the payments dimension by providing the
technological infrastructure for financial apps like Venmo. Along the
lending dimension, LendingTree is an online platform that matches
potential borrowers with loan providers; and Rocket Mortgage uses
online applications rather than brick-and-mortar branches to provide
mortgages. (Figure A1 in the Appendix provides a visual illustration
of this disaggregation and, in some cases, reaggregation of the
business of banking.)
These new entrants are able to grow and compete against existing
banks because they often have better technology—hence, many are
categorized as “financial technology” or “FinTech” companies—but
also because they are not subject to the same regulatory and
supervisory requirements as existing banks. 3 In other words, these
new entrants often operate and thrive in a regulatory gray area,

See Michael Hsu, Modernizing the Financial Regulatory Perimeter, Remarks at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Fifth Annual Fintech Conference (Nov. 16,
2021) (“Banking consists of three bundled activities: taking deposits, making loans,
and facilitating payments. In the early 2010s, fintechs began to unbundle the
payments leg, offering goods and services aimed at improving customers’ payments
experiences… The largest payments fintechs have not stopped there, however. Many
have augmented their platforms and expanded into adjacent areas, such as extending
various forms of credit and offering interest on cash held. Today, a range of fintechs
provide seemingly the full suite of banking and investment services—including in
cryptocurrencies—with the convenience of tech.”). See also Dan Awrey, Unbundling
Banking, Money, and Payments, GEO. L. J. (forthcoming) (“For centuries, our systems
of banking, money, and payments have been legally and institutionally intertwined.”).
1

Stablecoins have been in the news recently, given the spectacular collapse of the
algorithmic stablecoin TerraUSD. See, e.g., David Yaffe-Bellany & Erin Griffith, How
a Trash-Talking Crypto Founder Caused a $40 Billion Crash, N.Y. TIMES (May 18,
2022); Alexander Osipovich & Caitlin Ostroff, Crash of TerraUSD Shakes Crypto.
“There Was a Run on the Bank.” WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2022).
2

See Dan Awrey & Kathryn Judge, Why Financial Regulation Keeps Falling Short,
61 B.C. L. REV. 2295, 2304 (2020) (“Given the myriad costs associated with operating
a bank, from complying with activity restrictions to ongoing supervisory oversight and
deposit insurance premiums, regulatory arbitrage was likely among the forces driving
the rapid growth of this shadow banking system in the years leading up to the crisis.”).
3
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outside of the well-established and well-guarded “regulatory
perimeter.”
In November 2021, the President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets—including the Treasury Department and all Federal
banking and securities regulatory agencies—released a report on
stablecoins, noting that these financial instruments “currently fall
outside of the regulatory perimeter altogether.”4 That same month,
Acting Comptroller of the Currency Michael Hsu gave remarks on
“modernizing the financial regulatory perimeter” to propose a
framework for regulating synthetic banking.5 Lawmakers, regulators,
and supervisors now frequently mention the regulatory perimeter in
public speeches. But what exactly is the regulatory perimeter, and
why is it so crucial for the growth and stability of the financial system?
***
Banking organizations in the United States have long been subject to
two broad categories of regulatory requirements. The first is
permissive: a “positive” grant of rights and privileges, typically via a
charter for a corporate entity, to engage in the business of banking.6
The second is restrictive: a “negative” set of conditions on those rights
and privileges, limiting conduct and imposing a program of oversight
and enforcement, by which the holder of that charter must abide.7

4 President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Report on Stablecoins (2021). The
Report was the result of a collaborative effort by the Department of the Treasury, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), and the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (“OCC”).
5 Hsu, supra note 1. See also Christopher J. Waller, Risk in the Crypto Markets,
Speech at the SNB-CIF Conference on Cryptoassets and Financial Innovation, Zürich,
Switzerland (Jun. 3, 2022) (“By law or by practice, many crypto-related products and
activities fall between the cracks of traditional legal and regulatory structures,
outside the so-called “regulatory perimeter.” In that environment, the normal
backstops and safety nets of traditional finance do not necessarily or reliably apply.
High volatility is the rule, not the exception; fraud and theft occur regularly, often at
large scale. Your whole pot is always on the table; you take part at your own risk.”).
6 Positive requirements in this context also fall under the umbrella of “entry
restrictions.” See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, Entry Restriction, Shadow Banking, and the
Structure of Monetary Institutions, 2(2) J. FIN. REG. 291 (2015).

See Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schulz, & Jonathan Klick, Two Dimensions of
Regulatory Competition, 26 INT’L. REV. L. ECON. 56 (2006) (providing a model of
regulatory competition in multi-body administrative settings). See also Dan Awrey,
Bad Money, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2020) (noting that banks issue money from within
“highly sophisticated public regulatory frameworks designed, in part, to enhance the
7
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Together, these requirements form a legal cordon, or “regulatory
perimeter,” around the U.S. banking sector. Inside that perimeter are
firms that can legally conduct a set of banking activities, subject to
various forms of regulation and supervision. Outside that perimeter
are firms conducting other financial and non-financial activity, under
the broad heading of “commerce”—subject to other laws and
restrictions, but not to the specific combination of positive grants and
negative restrictions of the perimeter. A range of firms lie close to the
boundary, blurring the distinctions between commerce and banking.8
Today’s regulatory perimeter faces a variety of challenges and
pressures—from the “unbundling” and “re-bundling” of the traditional
banking business; to the growth of stablecoins, stored-value platforms,
and other new technologies; to the entry of commercial firms into the
financial services space; to the advent of new financial services
charters, with new uses for old ones. These developments are the topic
of substantial current scholarship. 9 For instance, Professor Dan
Awrey has examined the way in which the regulatory perimeter
entrenches banks’ ability to bundle deposit-taking, loan extensions,
and payments. 10 Professors Gary Gorton and Jeffery Zhang have
discussed the systemic dangers of stablecoins proliferating outside of
the regulatory perimeter. 11 Professors Howell Jackson and Morgan
Ricks have proposed fitting stablecoins within the existing regulatory

credibility of these promises” while upstarts like PayPal “seek to issue money outside
the perimeter”).
8 See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Bank, Commerce, and
Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2013); Reid B. Stevens & Jeffery Y. Zhang, The
Costs of Banks Engaging in Non-Banking Activities: A Case Study, 39 YALE J. ON REG.
375 (2022).

See, e.g., Ryan Clements, Defining the Regulatory Perimeter for Stablecoins in
Canada, CANADIAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL (forthcoming); Agustín Carstens, Stijn
Classens, Fenando Restoy, & Hyun Song Shin, Regulating Big Techs in Finance, BIS
Bulletin No. 45 (Aug. 2, 2021); Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James, & JeanPierre Landau, The Digitalization of Money, NBER Working Paper No. 26300 (Sep.
2019).
9

10 See Awrey, supra note 1 (noting the reluctance “to fundamentally rethink the legal
frameworks that support and entrench our current bundled system of banking,
money, and payments”).
11 See Gary B. Gorton & Jeffery Y. Zhang, Taming Wildcat Stablecoins, 90 U. CHI. L.
REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that issuers of stablecoins are essentially unregulated
banks that are susceptible to destabilizing runs).
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perimeter, analyzing whether stablecoins may already be subject to
some established system of financial regulation.12
Scholars, however, have yet to draw lessons from the centuries’ worth
of legal changes to the regulatory perimeter itself. These lessons are
worth learning because regulators and supervisors now chase moving
targets, which can arbitrage from one legal category to another. The
perimeter is, in short, often quite easily breached. In normal times,
when markets are functioning smoothly, this arbitrage goes
unaddressed, and the resulting efficiency gains deliver benefits. In
times of economic stress, however, a rapid deterioration in conditions
can lead to financial ruin for many, particularly for the most
vulnerable. Previous generations have engaged in a similar exercise
to balance the timeless trade-off between financial innovation and
financial stability. Lawmakers looking to strike the right balance
between efficiency and safety while crafting the next iteration of the
regulatory perimeter should understand how we got here in the first
place.
***
In Parts I and II of this Article, we first explain the creation and
evolution of the U.S. regulatory perimeter. In Part III, we present
several lessons for today’s regulators who are attempting to revise the
perimeter. These lessons include, inter alia, a discussion of the
patterns in the perimeter’s nature, shape, and position. 13 As a
preview, we see these patterns from three different perspectives.
Outside-in pressure. Firms outside the regulatory perimeter—
sometimes, but not always, with a commercial presence—enter into
more direct competition with firms inside it, offering the services of a
regulated bank while avoiding most or all of its requirements.
Engaging in this regulatory arbitrage permits firms to traverse the

12 See Howell E. Jackson & Morgan Ricks, Locating Stablecoins within the Regulatory
Perimeter, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (Aug. 5, 2021)
(arguing that stablecoins may be “covered by one of the surviving provisions of the
Glass-Steagall Act: Section 21(a)(2)”).
13 Importantly, we do not view this pattern as systemic, deterministic, or necessary,
nor as a rigid account of the instances of perimeter change we describe; instead, we
intend it as a gedankenbild, a “unified analytical concept” derived from “concrete
individual phenomena.” See Max Weber, Objectivity in Social Science and Social
Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 90 (E.A. Shils & H.A. Finch,
eds. and trans., 2011); Jon Hendricks & C. Breckinridge Peters, The Ideal Type and
Sociological Theory, 16 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 31, 32 (1973).
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perimeter, often increasing the ties between banking and commerce
and eroding the value of a bank charter.
Inside-out pressure. Firms inside the regulatory perimeter respond to
this pressure by advocating regulation of their non-bank competitors.
Regulated firms also form new partnerships, create new products,
convert to new charters, or lobby for changes to disadvantageous
regulatory requirements. They find allies in commercial firms, as well
as in competing regulators and jurisdictions. They argue that
restrictions are arbitrary, restraining innovation and unnecessarily
marking certain acceptable activities as unsafe; or, if not, that they
push conduct beyond the reach of regulation. In either case, they argue
these restrictions place regulated firms at a disadvantage, imperiling
their safety and soundness, the integrity of the financial system, and
overall economic growth.
Reform and expansion—by devil or disaster. Pressure on the perimeter
can culminate in action, either by scandal, crisis, or both. In response
to this pressure, regulators, legislators, and industry act to patch or
expand the perimeter—often while letting existing institutions
operate under legacy treatment—or increase permissible activities in
exchange for increased regulation. With few exceptions, the effect is
to push the perimeter outward, extending it to at least some set of
firms and activities not previously within regulators’ jurisdiction.
This Article concludes by explaining that the U.S. regulatory
perimeter is broader, more complex, and arguably more permeable
than at any point in its history. Suffice it to say, if the regulatory
perimeter remains in its current form or continues to weaken along
its recent historical trend, we will see the continued proliferation of
financial innovations in the regulatory gray area. Lawmakers and
regulators interested in improving the stability of our financial system
should consider modifying the perimeter based on the lessons provided
herein.
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Part I. The Early History of the Regulatory Perimeter
Our historical analysis of the U.S. regulatory perimeter begins in the
early Republic. 14 We examine the origins of bank chartering and
proceed onto the evolution of the perimeter that occurred through the
Civil War, through the founding of the Federal Reserve, and past the
New Deal.
A. Creating the Perimeter
1. The Early Separation of Banks and Corporates
In the beginning, no perimeter separated banking from other kinds of
corporate activity. During the late colonial era and the early American
Republic, almost all corporate entities were subject to positive and
negative regulatory requirements, regardless of their business or
activities. Incorporation was largely an exercise of state control over
local civic institutions; the Crown, and then colonies and states, issued
corporate charters that conferred limited liability and perpetual
personality, but which also came with a host of restrictive conditions.15
For most corporations, these conditions began to ease in the mid-19th
century. State governments began issuing charters without the
specific approval of the legislature, and courts began to distinguish
the (narrower) rights of public corporations from the (broader)
protections of private ones. 16 However, for banks—which remained
the lynchpin of state public finance—the conditions not only remained
14 The historical analysis presented herein is based on our working paper: Nicholas
K. Tabor, Katherine E. Di Lucido & Jeffery Y. Zhang, A Brief History of the U.S.
Regulatory Perimeter, FEDS Working Paper (Aug. 2021).

This power derived from the English law concept of visitation, which endures today
in the law of national banks. See Judge Glock, The Forgotten Visitorial Power: The
Origins of Administrative Subpoenas and Modern Regulation¸ 37(1) REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 205 (2017); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (“Visitorial powers with respect to national
banks . . .”); Jason Kaufman, Corporate Law and the Sovereignty of States, 73(3) AM.
SOC. REV. 402 (2008). In fact, private banking—and specifically, the establishment of
a private land bank in Massachusetts, using real estate to collateralize circulating
notes—was the site of a heated debate over British colonial control, spurring the
British government to extend the 1720 “Bubble Act” (and its regulation of
unincorporated joint-stock companies) to the Americas in 1841. See F. Ward
McCarthy, The Evolution of the Bank Regulatory Struggle: A Reappraisal, FRB
RICHMOND ECON. REV. (Mar./Apr. 1984).
15

See, e.g., Tr. of Dartmouth C. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Kaufman, supra
note 15, at 419; Ronald E. Seavoy, The Public Service Origins of the American
Business Corporation, 52(1) BUS. HIST. REV. 30 (1978); Ronald E. Seavoy, Laws to
Encourage Manufacturing: New York Policy and the 1811 General Incorporation
Statute, 46(1) BUS. HIST. REV. 85 (1972).
16
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but tightened.17 States began charging fees for issuing bank charters;
they taxed banks’ capital, dividends, deposits, and profits; acquired
shares in the banks themselves; and required banks to purchase
shares in (or issue “bonuses” to) state entities.18
These early charters also reflected a distinction older than the
corporate form itself: between permissible “banking” activities and
impermissible “commercial” ones.19 Initially, U.S. charter restrictions
on banking activity were general, often limiting the bank only to its
“usual banking powers.”20 However, as banks began to exercise the
discretion these charters allowed, states imposed narrower, more
tailored conditions. In New York, banks were generally prohibited
17 The extent of this fiscal dependency is hard to overstate. From 1836 to 1840, for
example, Massachusetts received more than 82 percent of its tax revenues from the
banking sector. See Richard Sylla, John B. Legler, & John J. Wallis, Banks and State
Public Finance in the New Republic: The United States, 1790-1860, 47(2) J. ECON.
HIST. 391 (1987); see also Bernard Shull, Separation of Banking and Commerce in the
United States, 18 J. BANKING & FIN. 255, 259 (1994) (noting that while general laws
of incorporation “altered the character of the charter granted by the state from ‘a right
to a defined enterprise’ to ‘any lawful business’ . . . for banking . . . the charter retained
the older form that defined and limited the business, and retained a governmental
body to regulate and supervise.”).

“The most famous example occurred in 1835, when a chastened Nicholas Biddle
desperately sought a Pennsylvania charter for the Bank of the United States, whose
federal charter was about to expire. The bank’s lobbyist spent $128,000 on legislative
pressure, and in the end the bank, by the terms of the state charter, had to pay
Pennsylvania a bonus of $2 million and grant the state a ‘temporary’ loan of $1 million
annually as well as a ‘permanent’ loan of $6 million.” The Regulated Economy: A
Historical Approach to Political Economy 136 (Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap eds.,
1994).
18

19 Restrictions on commercial activity date to at least the 13th century, during which
banks in Italian city-states were barred from participating in import-export or
commodity activities. See John Krainer, The Separation of Banking and Commerce,
FRBSF ECON. REV. (2000). As in the early Republic, however, the reality was more
complicated. Genoese, Venetian, and Florentine banks were originally established to
facilitate compulsory lending to the state and, later, to manage more complicated
forms of public debt. See Michele Frantianni & Franco Spinelli, Italian City-States
and Financial Evolution, 10 EUR. REV. ECON. HIST. 257 (2006). Once involved in trade
finance, these institutions could often secure dominant positions in the markets they
were financing. The rents associated with such activity were substantial. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Goldthwaite, The Medici Bank and the World of Florentine Capitalism,
114 PAST & PRESENT 3 (1987).
20 In 1839, for example, only 66 of 97 New York State bank charters had specified
limits on permissible business, or a specific definition of the business of banking.
Davis Dewey, State Banking Before the Civil War, National Monetary Commission
Report, 61 Cong. 2d Sess. 43 (1907). Commercial actors also remained deeply involved
in early banking activities; more than two thirds of the directors and officers of the
banks of New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore in 1840, 1850, and 1860 were or had
been merchants. Harold C. Livesay & Glenn Porter, The Financial Role of Merchants
in the Development of U.S. Manufacturing, 1815-1860, 9 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST.
67 (1971-72).
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from transacting in goods or commodities, except those received as
collateral on a defaulted loan (e.g., in connection with debt previously
contracted); in Massachusetts, banks were limited to real estate
holdings worth 12 percent of capital; and in Maine, limits existed on
holdings of property in fee simple, but not on any other form of
ownership.21 At least in part, these restrictions reflected concerns that
banks with unconstrained powers would favor the merchant class.22
These restrictions became more uniform with the spread of
“restraining acts,” clarifying that only those with the affirmative
permission of the state could engage in the “business of banking.”23
However, consistency came at the cost of specificity: Restraining acts
rarely said what the “business of banking” actually was. 24 The

21 Id. at 44 (citing 87 Sen. Doc. NY (Apr. 11, 1839)). These motley restrictions were
not limited to the United States and were sometimes visible within a single
institution. For example, the 1694 charter of the Bank of England prohibited the Bank
from trading in “goods, wares, or merchandise”—while simultaneously requiring the
bank to lend its capital stock only and exclusively to the government. See Halley
Goodman, The Formation of the Bank of England: A Response to Changing Political
and Economic Climate, 1694, 17 PENN. HIST. REV. 10 (2009).
22 The Bank of North America is an instructive example. In 1781, the bank was
chartered principally to help finance the expenses of the Army of the Potomac. Three
years later, its Pennsylvania charter was repealed after sustained protests by
agrarian interests, who claimed that the bank unduly benefited merchants; the
charter had not restricted the bank’s commercial activities. Shortly after, in 1787,
Pennsylvania granted the bank another charter, with several new limitations: the
bank’s corporate existence was limited to fourteen years, the bank was forbidden to
hold real estate not necessary for its existence, and the bank was prohibited from
“trading in any merchandise, save bullions and bills of exchange.” Laurence Lewis Jr.,
A HISTORY OF THE BANK OF NORTH AMERICA: THE FIRST BANK CHARTERED IN THE UNITED
STATES 73 (1882) (citing Act of March 17, 1787, 2 Dallas’ Laws, 499). See also Bray
Hammond, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR
(1957). The First and Second Banks of the United States had similar restrictions in
their charters, limiting land ownership and “deal[ing] or trad[ing] in any thing, except
bills of exchange, gold or silver bullion, or in the sale of goods really and truly pledged
for money lent and not redeemed in due time.” An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers
to the Bank of the United States, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191 (1791); An Act to Incorporate the
Subscribers to the Bank of the United States, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266 (1816).

This affirmative permission also increased the rents that states could demand for
charters, corruptly or otherwise. See McCarthy, supra note 15, at 7; Bray Hammond,
Free Banks and Corporations: The New York Free Banking Act of 1838, 44(2) J. POL.
ECON. 184-209, 187 (1936) (citing New York Fireman Insurance Co. v. Ely, 2 Cowen
678-712 (the object of [New York’s 1804] restraining act was to guarantee to these
banks “a monopoly of the rights and privileges granted to them, which had been
encroached upon or infringed by private associations . . .”).
23

24 See Roger S. White, Evolution of the Legal Framework for Government Regulation
of Commercial Banking, 1 PROC. BUS. HIST. CONF. 83 (2d series, 1973) (detailing 35
restraining statutes in 26 states).
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boundaries of these acts were quickly tested and often surmounted.25
A notable example involved the Manhattan Company, a corporation
chartered in 1798 to lay water pipes for the City of New York.26 The
company’s charter included a provision that let it invest surplus
capital in any legal “monied transactions or operations.”27 Then-New
York Assemblyman Aaron Burr drafted the charter, voted to approve
it, and then joined the board of the new company, which became the
forerunner of Chase Manhattan Bank. Its infrastructure activity
remained meager, and New York lacked an adequate supply of clean
drinking water for the next 40 years.28
2. The Federal Perimeter and the Early Dual Banking System
Before the Civil War, federally chartered banks (i.e., mainly, the First
and Second Banks of the United States) generally faced more explicit
restrictions on commercial activity.29 Subsequent federal restrictions
evolved from state “free banking” laws, which replaced the restraining
acts and removed artificial caps on the number of bank charters .30
However, the new laws often contained their own lists of specific

Shull, supra note 17, at 258 (“Banking powers were obtained by ‘internal
improvement’ companies to build canals, railroads, and turnpikes . . . . When the
Second Bank of the U.S. was rechartered [sic] by Pennsylvania . . . [it] invested heavily
in securities, attempted to support the market for cotton, and failed in 1841.”).
25

26 Edwin G. Burroughs & Mike Wallace, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY TO
1898 361 (1998).
27

Id.

28 Id. The company would also play a substantial role in financing the DemocraticRepublican candidates in the contested election of 1800. See Brian Phillips Murphy,
‘A very convenient instrument’: The Manhattan Company, Aaron Burr, and the
Election of 1800, 65(2) WM. & MARY Q. 233 (2008).
29 Even these restrictions were often illusory. For example, despite charter limitations
on dealing in commodities, the Second Bank of the United States (and its then
president, Nicholas Biddle) orchestrated a plan to support cotton prices by cornering
the market in London. To evade the restrictions, Biddle and other officers of the bank
contracted with agents in the South to purchase cotton, ship it to other agents in
Liverpool, and hold the purchases back to inflate the price. The contracts were
financed by the sale of securities, including those of the bank, in London to British
financiers. The directors retained first recourse to the bank’s facilities, as was
customary at the time—meaning they enjoyed the support of the bank’s resources,
without bearing unlimited liability for its actions. See Hammond, supra note 22, at
466-70.

U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of
the Finances for the Year Ending June 30, 1861 19 (1861) (cited in McCarthy, supra
note 15, at 11) (justifying currency plan “[t]o enable the government to obtain the
necessary means for prosecuting the war to a successful issue, without unnecessary
cost”).
30
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activities that a bank could pursue.31 Under New York’s Free Banking
Act of 1838, for example, anyone with sufficient capital could establish
a bank—subject to the nation’s first-ever requirement of “safety and
soundness.”32 Once established, the Act held, that bank would “carry
on the business of banking” by discounting debt, receiving deposits,
buying and selling bullion, making loans “on real and personal
security,” and “by exercising such incidental powers as shall be
necessary to carry on such business.”33
The National Bank Act of 1863 embraced language similar to the New
York law, authorizing holders of national banking charters to engage
only in the “business of banking” and exercise powers “incidental”
thereto.34 Early case law showed that this limitation was far-reaching
but porous. 35 National banks could not originate mortgages (since
Congress specified their power to lend “on personal security,” not real
property) but could host apartments and unrelated businesses
Edward L. Symons Jr., Business of Banking in Historical Perspective, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 676, 690 (1982). See also Hammond, supra note 22, at 186-90.
31

Hammond, supra note 22, at 597. The Act was eventually challenged on the basis
that the New York legislature could not pass such an Act without a two-thirds vote of
all legislators, which the Act had not received, and that a law authorizing “an
indefinite number of corporations would be unconstitutional.” Id. at 194. After a
decades-long controversy over whether a bank was a “corporation” for purposes of
state law, New York’s Court for the Correction of Errors—then the highest court of
New York, composed of state senators, the president of the New York Senate, the
chancellor of the Court of Chancery, and three justices of the (lower) Supreme Court—
ruled that banks were not corporations and upheld the Act. Id.
32

33

Ch. 260, § 18, 1838 N.Y. Laws 245, 249; Symons, supra note 31, at 690.

Symons, supra note 3131, at 699. The Act also provides what appears to be the first
federal statutory definition of banking. Associations formed thereunder had “the
power to carry on the business of banking by obtaining and issuing circulating notes
in accordance with the provisions of this act; by discounting bills, notes, and other
evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling gold and silver bullion,
foreign coins, and bills of exchange; by loaning money on real and personal security,
in the manner specified in their articles of association, for the purposes authorized by
this act, and by exercising such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on
such business . . .” National Bank Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863). The
activities permissible for national banks have evolved over time by both statutory
amendment and interpretation. See 12 U.S.C. § 24; Shull, supra note 17, at 16-17.
34

35 At the same time, this jurisprudence suggests that contemporary ideas about the
contents of “banking” had been elaborated at the state level, and went far beyond
mere deposit-taking. See Oulton v. Savings Inst., 84 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1873) (noting,
in dicta, that “banks in the commercial sense are of three kinds, to-wit: 1, of deposit;
2, of discount; 3, of circulation,” and “an institution prohibited from exercising any
more than one of those functions is a bank in the strictest commercial sense . . . .”); cf.
Hinckley v. Belleville, 43 Ill. 183, 184 (1867) (holding “the business of a moneychanger,” defined as “a broker who deals in money or exchanges,” to “constitute . . .
the greater part” of “the business of a banker”).
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alongside its headquarters.36 National banks could acquire, own, or
dispose of stock in satisfaction of a debt (an “incidental” power) but
not “deal in” stock or own stock in a “speculative” enterprise (not an
“incidental” power).37 National banks could not engage directly in a
manufacturing or business enterprise under any circumstances” but
could buy seed, hire plowmen, and operate a farm, if the goal was to
preserve its value as collateral.38
Figure 1 presents a snapshot of the U.S. regulatory perimeter, here
circa 1864. Along the vertical axis, we map regulated entities roughly
to their respective regulators. Along the horizontal axis, we allocate
regulated activities into various zones of regulation, on a spectrum
from “banking” to “commerce.” In 1864, both the new Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and a new federal definition of the
“business of banking” have emerged. The relevant regulations at that
time were focused on the safety and soundness of banks (in the far
corner of the “prudential zone”); the rights and responsibilities
envisioned in the new federal banking law applied specifically to
banks, voluntarily chartered as such.
Even with these patchwork exceptions, national banking rules were
more stringent than state-level regulation, and state banks
maintained significant market share until 1865, when Congress levied
a 10 percent tax on all state bank notes. 39 The tax caused a sharp
decline among state banks, but they experienced a steady resurgence.
States eased chartering requirements and enforcement of existing
banking laws, and state banks avoided the note tax by abandoning
note issuance altogether by letting customers use checks to transfer
money on deposit.40

36 Powers of National Banks to Acquire Various Kinds of Property, 33 HARV. L. REV.
718, 719 (1920) (citing U.S.R.S. § 5137; Brown v. Schleier, 194 U.S. 18 (1901)).

Id. (citing U.S.R.S. § 5201; First Nat’l. Bank of Ottawa v. Converse, 200 U.S. 425
(1906)).
37

Id. (citing Cockrill v. Abeles, 86 Fed. 505 (1898), Nat’l. Bank v. Bannister, 7 Kan.
App. 78 (1898)).
38

39

McCarthy, supra note 15, at 12.

Id.; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE
CURRENCY, 1936-1966: Stabilization and Challenge.
40

OF THE

COMPTROLLER
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Fig. 1: The Federal Financial Regulatory Perimeter, Circa 1864
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A familiar cycle followed.41 Some states resisted the trusts’ expansion
into providing virtually all banking services, but most states came to
endorse it, via a mix of favorable court decisions and new laws. 42
Banks responded by seeking the right to offer trust services, and in
many cases, they succeeded.43 Gradually, the two sets of institutions
(banks and trusts) began to resemble one another, and regulators
began to express alarm about the lighter regulation the trusts
received. 44 A mix of half-measures followed—including holding
company-like structures in California, New Hampshire, and
Michigan, which let trusts take deposits, but required those deposits
to remain separate from other sources of funding. 45 By 1907, trust
companies were active money-market participants, essential to both
overnight securities lending and short-term cross-border (sterling)

41 A somewhat similar cycle emerged during the 1880s and 1890s around building and
loan associations, cooperative entities that at their peak served over 11 million
customers. Larger-scale national associations emerged from the more than 5,000 local
associations, avoiding the interstate banking restrictions that applied to banks. These
new entrants charged higher fees and lacked robust local loan diligence, but they
promised dividend yields “several times those available from banks, local associations,
or government bonds.” Downturns in 1893 and 1897 would shutter most national
associations, though building and loan associations arose again in the 1920s, before
ebbing again in the 1930s. David A. Price and John R. Walter, It’s a Wonderful Loan:
A Short History of Building and Loan Associations, Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, Economic Brief EB19-01 (Jan. 2019), at 3-5.
42 Stutter steps on this issue were common. In Pennsylvania, for example, an 1874
general incorporation statute allowed for title-insurance companies, but not trust
companies; an 1881 act gave certain title-insurance companies trust powers, but
prohibited them from offering banking services; an 1885 act gave such companies the
right to accept deposits; an 1895 act gave them the right to issue notes and loans; and
a 1900 federal court decision gave them the right to take both demand and time
deposits. Id. at 17. Compare State v. Lincoln Trust Co., 144 Mo. 562 (1898) (holding
that trusts cannot accept interest-free demand deposits, but can accept time deposits
with nominal interest payable on demand by check).
43 George Ernest Barrett, State Banks and Trust Companies Since the Passage of the
National-Bank Act, U.S. Nat’l. Monetary Comm., Sen. Doc. 659, 61 Cong. (1911), at
19. Banks were not the only institutions to do so; see Sup’t. of Banks of N.Y., Annual
Report xxiii (1907) (“A like evil exists in the case of certain business corporations such
as department stores, which, through a merely technical compliance with the law,
receive deposits and pay therefor [sic] high rates of interest.”).
44 Barrett, supra note 43, at 20 (“An injustice would be done were we to deal with all
financial institutions in accordance with the names under which they operate rather
than with reference to the character of business in which they are actually engaged.”).

Id. at 22-23. New Jersey passed the nation’s first holding company law in 1889, and
while its scope was broader than financial services, its development was intimately
connected to trust-related issues. See Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race:
Competition for Corporate Charters and the Rise and Decline of New Jersey, 32 J.
CORP. L. 323, 340 (2006-07).
45
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trade finance.46 The trusts controlled roughly as many assets as all
national banks combined, without the national banks’ reserve
requirements, investment restrictions, or (in many cases)
clearinghouse membership costs.47
On October 16, 1907, a failed takeover of a large copper firm spread
insolvency rumors through the New York markets. When those
rumors hit the sizable Knickerbocker Trust Company, a run ensued;
bank deposits and loans remained steady, but those at the largely
unregulated trusts collapsed.48 Call-money interest rates spiked, and
stocks plummeted, until a backstop for the other failing trusts
emerged. 49 The consequences of the panic were dire, sparking a
recession that reached far beyond the financial sector into the real
economy.50
B. Uniting the Perimeter
1. Post-1907 Reforms
The Congressional and industry debate that followed the Panic of 1907
focused on reserves, not regulation—on the inability of banks to
marshal liquid resources, and on the decreasing probability that J.P.
Morgan would live to stem the next crisis, as he did the last.51 For the
first time, however, the public debate was dominated by questions of
monopoly power in both banking and commerce, in keeping with

46 Jon Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, The Bank Panic of 1907: The Role of Trust
Companies, 52(3) J. ECON. HIST. 611, 615-16 (1992); Jon Moen & Ellis W. Tallman,
The Panic of 1907, FEDERAL RESERVE HISTORY (Dec. 4, 2015).
47 Moen & Tallman (1992), supra note 4646, at 612, 617 (estimating that pre-crisis
capital levels were approximately 4.8 percent at New York trusts, versus 5.8 percent
at state banks and 7.5 percent at national banks).

Id. at 611. The run occurred after the Knickerbocker Trust announced that its
clearing agent, National Bank of Commerce—a member of the New York Clearing
House—would no longer act on behalf of the Knickerbocker Trust. Without a clearing
agent, the Knickerbocker Trust lacked even indirect access to clearinghouse funding.
Carola Frydman, Eric Hilt & Lily Y. Zhou, Economic Effects of Runs on Early “Shadow
Banks”: Trust Companies and the Panic of 1907, 123(4) J. POL. ECON. 902, 909 (2015).
Rumors involving interlocking directorates helped propagate the spread; see
Lowenstein, infra note 51.
48

This backstop was, famously, the personal intervention of J. P. Morgan. See Moen
& Tallman (2015), supra note 46.
49

50

Id.

For a review of this debate, see Roger Lowenstein, AMERICA’S BANK: THE EPIC
STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2015).
51
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broader reform efforts in the Progressive Era.52 Hearings in the U.S.
House Banking and Currency Committee focused on the nearcollusive relationship between large banks in the issuance of railroad
securities. 53 These hearings documented interlocking directorates
between banks and their clients, and proposed a (failed) measure to
prohibit such interlocks. 54 Discussions of a potential new reserve
system centered on where power could or should be concentrated—in
the East or the West, in large banks or small ones, in government or
the banking industry.55
The Federal Reserve Act that stemmed from this debate narrowed the
regulatory gap between national banks, state banks, and trusts. The
Act made Federal Reserve membership—and the requirements that
went with it—mandatory only for national banks.56 All other banks
and trust companies could apply for membership, if they met the same
capital, reserve, reporting, liability, and other regulatory
requirements as a national bank (including, after the Act’s passage,
potential supervision by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Board)).57 This offer of Federal Reserve services (and
access to emergency lending) as a conditional benefit preserved the
dual banking system, while applying federal bank regulation to
consenting state banks. It also gave the banking industry leverage in
the legislative debate. 58 Money-center banks used this leverage to
extract concessions on perimeter issues—for example, earning

See, e.g., id. at 137 (quoting Robert La Follette, describing the Aldrich plan as “a
plot to siphon ‘the people’s money’ to monopolies and trusts”); id. at 143 (quoting
Woodrow Wilson, “the greatest monopoly in this country is the money monopoly”); id.
at 149 (quoting Alfred Owen Crozier, decrying the Aldrich plan as “a huge private
money trust to monopolize and forever control the entire public currency . . . of the
United States”). Significant concern also existed about the extent to which this money
monopoly determined which enterprises received capital. Vincent P. Carosso, The
Wall Street Money Trust from Pujo through Medina, 47(4) BUS. HIST. REV. 421, 426
(1973).
52

53

Lowenstein, supra note 51, at 175-76.

54

Id. at 192, 222, 228.

55

See, e.g., id. at 228.

56

V. Gilmore Iden, THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT OF 1913 48 (1914).

57

Id. at 49-51

58 At one point, the head of City National Bank publicly threatened that, if the Federal
Reserve remained under federal (instead of private) control, banks would abandon
both the new institution and their old national charters. The threat did not
materialize. Lowenstein, supra note 51, at 219-20.
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national banks the right to make farm mortgages and open foreign
branches, and narrowly avoiding a deposit insurance requirement.59
Figure 2 depicts the regulatory perimeter shortly after the Federal
Reserve Act was passed. Although regulated categories in this
diagram are still limited to the “prudential zone,” more prudential
regulators and more categories have emerged. The OCC has
jurisdiction over “national banks,” “national currency associations,”
and “foreign branches” of national banks. The Federal Reserve has
jurisdiction over its “member banks.” State regulators have
jurisdiction over, among other entities defined in federal law, “state
banks,” “non-member banks,” “state banking associations,” and “state
trust companies.”

Id. at 248-49; Iden, supra note 56, at 91-92. The Federal Reserve Act also eliminated
the competitive advantage relied upon by trust companies by permitting national
banks to engage in trust activities. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 063-43, § 11(k),
38 Stat. 262 (1913) (Board has discretion to permit national banks to engage in trust
activities). See also Act of Sept. 28, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-722, 76 Stat. 668 (1962)
(transferring authority to grant permission to the OCC); 12 U.S.C. § 92a. Attempts by
the trust companies to overturn this provision failed, First Nat’l Bank of Bay City v.
Grant Fellows, 244 U.S. 416 (1917), and in 1918, Congress authorized national banks
to act “in any other fiduciary capacity that state banks or trust companies did in the
state where the national bank was located.” Eugene N. White, Innovation in the
1920s: The Growth of National Banks’ Financial Services, 13 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 92,
96 (1984).
59
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Fig. 2: The Federal Financial Regulatory Perimeter, Circa 1916
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2. The Inter-Crisis Period
The state/federal regulatory gap narrowed after the Act’s passage, but
it did not close.60 Federal war and agricultural finance efforts sparked
a dramatic expansion of U.S. capital markets.61 By the end of World
War I, New York sat at the center of a global system of private, crossborder, and increasingly short-term credit. 62 Over the 1920s, this
system also came to dominate domestic financing activity, and as more
companies tapped capital markets for financing needs, commercial
bank loans shrank to a fraction of total business credit.63 State banks,
trust organizations, and commercial finance companies could respond
to this shift by underwriting or dealing in securities, a practice that
remained largely unregulated; national banks (with some exceptions)
could not.64 To remain competitive—and to avoid other measures, like
higher reserve requirements and real estate restrictions65—national
banks began shedding their charters by merging with state banks,
acquiring trust companies, or launching securities affiliates under

60 New gaps also emerged. See Elizabeth F. Brown, Prior Proposals to Consolidate
Federal Financial Regulators, THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE (Apr. 20, 2015), at 14-19; see
also McCarthy, supra note 15, at 17.
61 See Parintha Sastry, The Political Origins of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. (2018), at 7-13 (describing eligibility of Treasury,
Treasury-secured member, Farm Loan Bank, War Finance Corporation, Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank, and Reconstruction Finance Corporation Debt for Federal
Reserve Bank discount).
62 See Tobias Straumann, 1931: DEBT, CRISIS, AND THE RISE OF HITLER (2019); Adam
Tooze, THE DELUGE: THE GREAT WAR AND THE REMAKING OF GLOBAL ORDER (2014);
Liaquat Ahmad, LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO BROKE THE WORLD (2009).

See Lauchlin Currie, The Decline of the Commercial Loan, 45(4) Q. J. ECON. 698
(1931).
63

Notably, the Federal Reserve did not treat national banks and state member banks
equally in this regard. Legislation passed in 1917 provided that a state member bank
or trust company “shall retain its full charter and statutory rights as a State bank or
trust company, and may continue to exercise all corporate powers granted it by the
State in which it was created, and shall be entitled to all privileges of member banks.”
Raymond Kent, Dual Banking Between the Two World Wars, in BANKING AND
MONETARY STUDIES 47 (Deane Carson ed., 1963) (cited in McCarthy, supra note 15, at
17).
64

These restrictions included a measure barring national banks (but not state
member banks) from “lending to any individual, partnership, or corporation in excess
of 10 percent of their capital stock and surplus.” The McFadden Act later raised this
limit to 25 percent with respect to securities transactions and 15 percent with respect
to safe-deposit-box subsidiaries. Id. at 50.
65
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“holding company” structures.66 Banks also pushed to loosen activity
constraints, finding a receptive audience in both Congress and other
regulators.67 Finally, in 1927, the McFadden Act (mostly known for
easing restrictions on intrastate branching) removed the bar on
national banks’ dealing in “investment securities” altogether.68
For a time, these reforms served their intended purpose; regulatory
differences shrank, the exodus from the national system slowed, and
some large state member banks converted back to the national
charter.69 By the start of 1929, however, a half-dozen of the largest
national banks had again returned to the state system.70 The following
three years revealed the shortcomings of this arrangement.
In November 1930, the banking subsidiary of Caldwell and
Company—a Nashville, Tennessee holding company—marked
significant losses from “depreciation in the value of securities” and

66 Id. at 46 (“According to the 1924 report of the Comptroller, 206 national banks
having capital stock of $100,000 or more had been converted to or been absorbed by
state institutions in the period since January 1, 1918; these banks had taken $2,234
million of assets out of the national banking system.”). It is worth noting, however,
that many large national banks were more than competitive with their state
counterparts during this period and, in fact, remained dominant in international
finance. See Ahmad, supra note 62 at 210.
67 As with Citigroup in the 1990s, the Comptroller’s rulings on securities dealing
reflected practices that national banks had already adopted. See, e.g., U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency 12 (1924) (“Section 24 of the Federal
reserve act [sic] should be further amended to enable a national bank to buy and sell
investment securities,” but such measure “would make very little change in existing
practices, since a great number of national banks now buy and sell investment
securities, and the office of the comptroller has raised no objection because this has
become a recognized service which a bank must render . . . .”).
68 The McFadden Act was only the second amendment to the statutory powers of
national banks since the National Bank Act itself. 12 U.S.C. § 24; R.S. § 5136 (1864).
The first was a 1922 change giving national bank charters succession of 99 years, in
lieu of 20, thus removing an impediment to avenues of participation in trust activities.
See 44 Stat. 1226 (1927); 42 Stat. 767 (July 1, 1922); Gary Richardson, Daniel Park,
Alejandro Komai, & Michael Gou, McFadden Act of 1927, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22,
2013). The Act also enumerated a number of “incidental powers . . . necessary to carry
on the business of banking,” including “discounting and negotiating promissory notes,
drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying
and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and
by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes” subject to certain limits. Pub. L. No. 69639, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 1224 (1927).
69

Kent, supra note 64, at 54.

70

Id.
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shut its doors.71 Caldwell’s announcement triggered a cascade of bank
runs—not through the Federal Reserve’s clearing systems, but
through parallel correspondent-banking networks, which still
connected state-chartered institutions.72 The result was an inability
to access reserves, very similar to what banks experienced in 1907,
and the first domestic banking crisis of the Great Depression. When
paired with higher leverage, years of accommodative reserve policy,
and restrictive discounting policies at Federal Reserve Banks, stress
that began outside the regulatory perimeter was fatal to thousands of
U.S. banking organizations within it.73
C. Expanding the Perimeter
1. The New Deal
The Great Depression prompted efforts to address the perimeter gaps
that made the banking crisis possible. Congress’s ultimate approach
was to make the federal financial regulatory perimeter both broader
and stronger—adding positive rights, particularly in the securities
space, while imposing new negative restrictions.
To broaden the perimeter, Congress first took steps to expand nonmember banks’ access to Federal Reserve emergency credit—for one

71 See Gary Richardson, The Check Is in the Mail: Correspondent Clearing and the
Collapse of the Banking System, 1930-1933, 67(3) J. ECON. HIST. 643, 659 (2007).
72 Id. at 660-65. The Federal Reserve served as an alternative to the private interbank
clearing system before the Depression, making the private system more resilient to
solvency shocks, but less resilient to liquidity shocks. After the onset of the
Depression, the private interbank network became more concentrated in cities with
Federal Reserve Offices. See Matthew Jaremski & David C. Wheelock, The Founding
of the Federal Reserve, the Great Depression, and the Evolution of the U.S. Interbank
Network, 80(1) J. ECON. HIST. 69 (2019); Mark Carlson & David C. Wheelock, Did the
Founding of the Federal Reserve Affect the Vulnerability of the Interbank System to
Contagion Risk? 50(8) J. OF MONEY, BANKING, & CREDIT 1711 (2018); see also Erik
Heitfield, Gary Richardson, & Shirley Wang, Contagion During the Initial Banking
Panic of the Great Depression, NBER Working Paper 23629 (July 2017)
(demonstrating spatial and interbank contagion in initial banking crisis of
Depression, with fewer bank suspensions among more liquid, less highly leveraged
banks, and in Federal Reserve districts that pursued more accommodative liquidity
policy).
73 See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Background and Creation
(enumerating more than 9,000 banking failures between 1930 and 1933); Ben S.
Bernanke, Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the
Great Depression, 73(3) AM. ECON. REV. 257 (1983).
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year.74 Later, the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 clarified which firms
qualified as holding companies or affiliates of state or national banks,
and subjected them to a limited set of disclosure, examination, and
even some quantitative prudential requirements. 75 The Acts took a
similar approach to the new Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC)—a significant step that Congress contemplated but rejected in
1914—extending eligibility for deposit insurance to virtually all
banks, trusts, and “mutual savings banks” (and requiring it of all
national banks and member banks), but ensuring that either the
FDIC, OCC, or Federal Reserve would supervise every subscriber to
the insurance fund.76 Congress also required the largest state banks
to become Federal Reserve members by 1941, and it eased restrictions
on intrastate branching and real estate loans to align them more
closely with state rules.77
To strengthen the perimeter, the New Deal laws (particularly the
Glass-Steagall Act) created broad new federal statutory definitions of
74 This expansion proceeded in several halting stages. Congress first established the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), on the express condition that RFC debt
would not be eligible for rediscount by Federal Reserve Banks, but allowed Federal
Reserve Banks to rediscount member bank loans collateralized by RFC funds. (The
RFC, however, shared its senior leadership and office space with the Board of
Governors.) Under the new section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, Congress
expanded access to “any individual, partnership, or corporation,” but only for “real
bills,” i.e., short-term “self-liquidating” instruments tied to the conversion of raw
materials to finished goods. In its implementing regulations, the Board explicitly
excluded non-member banks from the definition of an eligible “corporation.” Only
after the passage of section 13(13) in the Emergency Banking Act of March 9, 1933—
and over the objection of the Board—did non-member banks and trusts gain access to
Federal Reserve Bank “advances,” at the discretion of the lending Federal Reserve
Bank, and subject to a sunset date. See Sastry, supra note 61.

See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 2(c), 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (defining
“holding company affiliate” by control over majority of shares or directors); id. § 5(c)
(describing, among other matters, examination and disclosure requirements for
affiliates); id. § 19 (describing conditions for approval of holding company affiliate
application for bank voting share, including holdings and early liquidity
requirement). But see Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 301, 49 Stat. 684
(1935) and 21 Fed. Res. Bull. 857 (1935) (generally exempting one-bank holding
companies from voting permit requirements). See also Mark B. Greenlee, Historical
Review of ‘Umbrella Supervision’ by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 407, 410-11 (2008).
75

76 Pub. L. No. 73-66, supra note 75, § 8; Pub. L. No. 74-305, supra note 75, § 101. In
addition, and over time, most states also required FDIC insurance for state
commercial banks, “as a condition of receiving a charter, either by statute, regulation,
or as a matter of administrative policy or practice.” John C. Dugan et al., FDIC
Insurance and Regulation of U.S. Branches of Foreign Banks, in REGULATION OF
FOREIGN BANKS AND AFFILIATES IN THE UNITED STATES 606 n.2 (Randall D. Guynn ed.,
8th ed. 2014).
77

Pub. L. No. 74-305, supra note 75, § 101.
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“banking” and “securities” activities, making it unlawful for new
categories of legal entities to engage in one to also engage in the
other.78 It imposed new restrictions on board composition and interaffiliate transactions to prevent firms from circumventing these new
definitions, and it required prior written consent from regulators for
certain bank acquisitions. It created a mandatory deposit-insurance
backstop, with governance that included all the federal regulatory
agencies and supervisory requirements that applied to all its
subscribers.79 Finally, it gave the President near-plenary authority to
exercise emergency powers over banking and other financial
institutions—state, federal, or unincorporated—if the new prudential
safeguards failed.80
Figure 3 shows the full effect of these transformative changes to the
regulatory perimeter, occurring from 1916 to 1940. The previous two
diagrams above show a perimeter limited to the first column—the
“prudential zone”—indicating a focus on the safety and soundness of
individual institutions. By the start of World War II, the perimeter
had expanded into new areas. In the “functional zone,” it now reaches
firms engaged in a panoply of securities activities, including issuance
and brokerage. However, it also reaches a new set of institutions less

78 Part of this statutory definition was circular—defining, in essence, a bank as an
organization that was legally a bank. The Banking Act of 1933 (including the GlassSteagall Act) defined “banks” by reference to section 1 of the Federal Reserve Act,
which itself defined “bank” as “to include State bank, banking association, and trust
company, except where national banks or Federal reserve banks are specifically
referred to.” Pub. L. No. 73-66, supra note 75; Pub. L. No. 063-43, supra note 53, § 1.
The Banking Act of 1935 defined national banks and national banking associations
by reference to their charter (and the National Bank Act of 1863 defined such
associations by their purpose for “carrying on the business of banking,” see supra note
34).

Other contemporary statutes offered a more functional definition. However, the
Banking Act of 1935 defined a state bank as “any bank, banking association, trust
company, savings bank, or other banking institution which is engaged in the business
of receiving deposits,” and it also defined deposits in detail. Pub. L. No. 74-305, supra
note 75. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 adopted a slightly different definition,
also anchored in charter status, but including firms “a substantial portion of the
business of which consists of receiving deposits or exercising fiduciary powers . . . .”
Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 3(a)(6), 48 Stat. 881 (1934); see also Securities Act of 1933, Pub.
L. No. 73-22, § 2(a)(1), 3(a)(2) 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
79 Specifically, the Banking Act of 1935 seated the Comptroller on the board of the
FDIC, required OCC- and Federal Reserve-regulated banks to subscribe to FDIC
insurance, required the OCC and the Federal Reserve to share reports of examination
with the FDIC, and allowed the FDIC to examine national and member banks only
with those other agencies’ permission. Pub. L. No. 74-305, supra note 75, § 101.
80

Emergency Banking Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 73-1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1 (1933).
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clearly defined by their charter status or activities, like the affiliates
of banks and holding companies. On the vertical axis, the perimeter
also reflects the arrival of two new regulatory agencies, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB).
Together, these measures effectively divided the perimeter into two
parts: an inner part of insured banking organizations, with access to
emergency lending, and an outer part, dividing securities-based
financial activity from commercial endeavors. Compared to 1913, the
reforms focused less on the dangers of monopoly than on avarice and
the possibility of national ruin. 81 They were also incomplete—for
example, extending visibility into banks’ non-bank affiliates as a
condition of voting permits and other benefits, but without creating
formal regulatory authority over them.82 Both points changed in the
early postwar period with the increasing popularity of holding
companies—new firms (or converted banks) that acquired and
controlled banking organizations in multiple states. 83 The principal
effect of these large holding company structures was to evade
interstate bank-branching restrictions.84

81 See, e.g., President Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933)
(“[T]here must be an end to a conduct in banking and in business which too often has
given to a sacred trust the likeness of callous and selfish wrongdoing . . . .”). However,
even early discussions of monopoly issues around bank holding companies focused on
the power of banks in credit markets, not on the power of financial firms in commercial
markets. More modern debates, like the dominance of conglomerates over commercial
activity or the risk of commercial activity to insured banks, did not figure prominently
in the early holding company discourse. See Hearings Before the House Committee on
Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1.
82

Note, The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 7 DUKE L. J. 1, 8 (1957).

83 Despite the increasing prominence of non-bank/bank relationships, both total
deposits and the number of branches controlled by non-bank holding companies
declined from 1933 to 1954. Id. However, many of these relationships emerged
through loopholes the New Deal legislation created, like exempting non-banks that
did not hold a majority stake or vote its shares in a member bank. Saule T. Omarova
& Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank
Holding Company Regulations in the United States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 130,
121-22 (2011-12).
84 In addition, as the Board of Governors pointed out in its 1943 report to Congress,
firms were using holding-company structures to avoid falling within the scope of the
Investment Company Act of 1940. See 1943 Fed. Res. Bd. Ann. Rep. 34-37. Compare
Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947) (finding that national bank
petitioners were engaged “substantially” and thus “primarily” in the business of
securities underwriting, and thus within Federal Reserve jurisdiction under Banking
Act of 1933).

25
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4202930

25

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 240 [2022]

Fig. 3: The Federal Financial Regulatory Perimeter, Circa 1940
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2. The Holding Company Debate
The Board began to voice concerns over this trend in the early 1940s—
arguing publicly that the laws of holding-company relationships were
rigid, formalistic, incomplete, and impotent, as well as a danger to
sound banking, fair competition, and the principles of fair play. 85
Soon, however, the focus of the holding-company debate narrowed to
the Transamerica Corporation, a conglomerate with minority
interests in four of the country’s largest banks, majority interests in
47 others, and other holdings in oil, insurance, real estate, heavy
manufacturing, lumber, and frozen vegetable companies.86 Starting in
1948, the Board pursued a bitter and ultimately unsuccessful fiveyear antitrust action against Transamerica, claiming the firm’s
actions substantially lessened competition between the banks it
acquired and tended to create a monopoly in the banking business.87

85 Only two lines in the Federal Reserve’s three-page argument refer to concerns about
broader commercial concentration. See 1943 Fed. Res. Bd. Ann. Rep. 36 (“It is
axiomatic that the lender and borrower or potential borrower should not be dominated
or controlled by the same management . . . .”); id. at 37 (“Moreover, the [holding
company] lends itself readily to the amassing of vast resources obtained largely from
the public which can be controlled and used by a few people and which give to them .
. . an unfair and overwhelming advantage in . . . carrying out an unlimited program
of expansion . . . .”).

The four banks in question were Bank of America N.T. and S.A, National City Bank
of New York, and Citizens National Trust & Savings Bank of Los Angeles. Together,
these financial holdings were worth more than $93 million and represented more than
60 percent of Transamerica’s assets. Transamerica Corp., 1948 Ann. Rep. 6, 14 (1948).
86

87 Broader discussion of the Transamerica case included three separate arguments:
the claim that large interstate banks would tend toward monopoly within banking;
the claim that banks would favor their commercial affiliates over other firms in the
same industry; and the claim that effective consolidated supervision of a financial
conglomerate is impossible. See, e.g., Note, Transamerica—The Bank Holding
Company Problem, 1 STAN. L. REV. 658, 660-67 (1949). The general focus on monopoly
concerns is also visible in the Bank Merger Act, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129
(1960), which required approval from the federal financial regulatory agencies for any
merger of insured depositories, and which harmonized the review standards of those
agencies with the Department of Justice.

The contentious Transamerica proceedings also included an unsuccessful motion to
disqualify Marriner Eccles for using “his position of public trust and power to promote
further his selfish personal interests” and advance a personal “grudge” against the
firms’ executives. Aff. Husbands ¶ 3, Motion to Disqualify Marriner S. Eccles and
Lawrence Clayton, U.S. before Board of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., In re:
Transamerica Corp. (Nov. 30, 1948). In those proceedings, the circuit court also
grappled with banking separation—claiming that “more than 100 years ago the
Supreme Court has held that banking was not commerce”—but did so via an apparent
misreading of dicta in an 1850 case to which no bank was party. Transamerica Corp.
v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 166 (3d. Cir, 1953) (citing Nathan v. Louisiana,
49 U.S. 73 (1850)).

27
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4202930

27

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 240 [2022]

However, the Board’s loss (and substantial lobbying from small and
independent banks) sparked Congressional involvement, culminating
in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.88 This legislation created
a broader, more flexible standard for finding non-bank control of a
bank, and it gave the Federal Reserve regulatory and supervisory
authority over the new category of “bank holding companies” (BHCs)
that met that standard. 89 It gave the Board control over BHC
acquisitions and approvals, created a blanket prohibition on BHC
acquisition of voting shares in “any company which is not a bank,” and
established a two-year sunset period for BHC ownership or control of
firms engaged in “any business other than that of banking.”90
The BHC Act expanded the regulatory perimeter but introduced
significant gaps to it. One, an exemption for non-bank trust
companies, was closed by amendment a decade later.91 Two other gaps
proved more durable and consequential. First, the Act excluded
companies that owned or controlled just one bank from the definition
of a BHC.92 Second, the Act defined a “bank” only by its charter status,
including national and state banks, uncapitalized savings banks, and
trust companies.93 Congress narrowed this scope further in 1966 by
shifting to a functional approach—defining a bank as a firm that
accepts demand deposits—while allowing single-bank holding

88

Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 83, at 121-22.

89 Specifically, a bank holding company under the Act “(1) directly or indirectly owns,
controls, or holds power to vote” at least 25 percent of the voting shares to two or more
banks (or bank holding companies), (2) controls “in any manner” the election of
directors of such banks, or (3) has at least 25 percent of the shares of such banks voted
for its shareholders’ benefit by a trustee. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L.
No. 84-511, § 2(a), 70 Stat. 133 (1956).
90 Specifically, the Act required prior Board approval for a company to become a bank
holding company, for a company to own or control more than 5 percent of a bank’s
voting shares, or for two or more bank holding companies to merge. The factors for
gaining that approval were broad, including the companies’ “prospects,” the
“character of their management,” and the “convenience, needs, and welfare of the
community concerned.” Id. § 3(a)-(c), 4(a).
91 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat. 236
(1966). This exemption was targeted mainly at the DuPont Trust, which owned more
than 30 Florida banks and non-bank businesses. The elimination of the exemption,
during a contentious strike at one of its railways, was targeted at DuPont as well. See
Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 83, at 139-40.
92

Id. § 2(a).

93 Pub. L. No. 89-485, supra note 91, § 2(c). The same was true of the Act’s definition
of a BHC “subsidiary,” which lacked the expansive “direct or indirect” and “holds
power” language of the Act’s definition of a BHC. Id. § 2(d).
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companies to vote their shares in a subsidiary bank without prior
approval from the Board.94
Put together, these loopholes created a powerful incentive to form a
specific type of holding company: one with a single bank and a number
of other non-bank affiliates.95 Banks and commentators attributed the
resulting growth in such BHCs to increased competition from nonbanks, which used new technology to offer higher-yield products and
a wider range of financial services.96 Whatever the reason, the rush
into these “congeneric” structures was swift. One-bank holding
companies multiplied from 117 in 1955, to 550 in 1965, to 800 in
1968.97 34 of the 100 largest U.S. banks formed or announced plans to
form one-bank holding companies in the two years after the 1966 BHC
Amendments passed, including Bank of America, Chase Manhattan,
First National City, Continental Illinois, Wells Fargo, and Morgan
Guaranty Trust.98 From 1965 to 1968, bank deposits under one-bank
holding-company control increased from $15.1 billion to $108.2 billion,
accounting for a quarter of all deposits.99

94 Id. § 3(c) (“‘Bank’ means any institution that accepts deposits that the depositor has
a legal right to withdraw on demand”).
95 Avoiding registration as a BHC required a company to derive at least 40 percent of
adjusted gross income from sources other than bank dividends, a bar most commonly
met by insurance holdings. See Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 83, at 146 (citing OneBank Holding Company Legislation of 1970: Hearing on S. 1052, S. 1211, S. 1664, S.
3823, and H.R. 6778 Before the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 140
(1970)); see also Franklin R. Edwards, The One-Bank Holding Company
Conglomerate, 6 VAND. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (1969).
96 Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 83, at 141 (citing Carl A. Sax & Marcus H. Sloan
III, The Bank Holding Company Amendments of 1970, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200
(1970)); see also Edwards, supra note 95, at 1282 (describing the role of credit cards,
higher-yield savings deposits, and the regulatory bar on paying interest on demand
accounts, as well as other factors); Recent Changes in the Structure of Commercial
Banking, 56 Fed. Res. Bull. 195, 200 (1970) [hereinafter Recent Changes] (“One-bank
holding companies may legally enter almost any industry in any geographic area.
Large banks have thus been motivated to form such companies in order to enter
product and geographic markets that they had formerly been barred or discouraged
from entering by either law or regulation. Some observers have viewed the recent
movement as a response to competitive pressures and to customer demands for a
wider variety of services . . . .”).
97 Edwards, supra note 95, at 1275 (citing U.S. House Committee on Banking and
Currency, The Growth of Unregistered Bank Holding Companies—Problems and
Prospects, 91st Cong. 1 (1969)).
98

U.S. House Committee on Banking and Currency, supra note 97, at 1.

99 Id. at 6. Branch banking—with “chain banking,” an alternative to holding companydriven expansion—also increased in this period, but less sharply, by roughly a fifth
from 1961 to 1969. See id. at 198.
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Independent banks sought refuge from this trend in the Comptroller’s
office.100 Directly and through subsidiaries, national banks competed
with the congenerics by expanding their activities into life insurance,
travel services, data processing, armored cars, credit reporting,
warehousing, and a range of other pursuits. Then-Comptroller James
Saxon sanctioned this expansion under the “incidental powers” clause
of the National Bank Act. 101 After the courts declined to endorse
Saxon’s interpretation of this clause, attention turned to Congress,
and to another round of BHC Act amendments.102
The 1970 Amendments followed the broad model of the 1966 bill:
expanding the scope of BHC designation authority, while narrowing
the scope of the term “bank.” 103 The Federal Reserve could now
designate a firm as a BHC if the Board found direct or indirect exercise
of a “controlling influence over the management and policies of a
bank,” regardless of ownership or control of the bank’s voting
shares.104 The Board could also define the non-banking activities that
BHCs could undertake, so long as those activities were still “closely
related” to banking and would produce a net public benefit. 105
However, to qualify as a bank under the BHC Act, an institution now
had to fit an even narrower definition—it needed to both accept
demand deposits and make commercial loans.106

100

Other legislative efforts came at the state level. Edwards, supra note 95, at 1286.

Saxon’s definition of banking, in Congressional correspondence, was similarly
broad. See Edwards, supra note 95, at 1279 (citing letter from Saxon to U.S.
Representative Edward J. Gurney (Oct. 26, 1964)).
101

102

Id. at 1280.

103

See Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 83, at 148.

Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101(a), 84
Stat. 760 (1970).
104

This provision—which the Board supported, and which replaced a “laundry-list”
approach in House legislation—was intended to be broader than the “business of
banking” language in the BHC Act itself, which the Board had interpreted as limiting
a BHC’s permissible holdings to affiliates that supported the activities of the bank
itself. See id. § 104(4); Alfred Hayes, President, FRBNY, The 1970 Amendments to
the Bank Holding Company Act: Opportunities to Diversify, Remarks Before the 43rd
Annual Mid-Winter Meeting of the New York State Bankers Association (January 25,
1971), in FRBNY MONTHLY REV. 23, Feb. 1971, at 24.
105

Pub. L. No. 91-607, supra note 104, § 101(c) (defining a bank as a U.S. institution
which “(1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on
demand, and (2) engages in the business of making commercial loans”). Fatefully, the
Act introduced a new statutory definition of “thrift institution,” covering not just the
mutual savings banks and cooperatives (with no capital stock) exempted from earlier
106
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Part II. The Modern Regulatory Perimeter
The U.S. regulatory perimeter experienced new pressures with the
rise of financial innovations in the mid-twentieth century. The
historical analysis in this Part II examines the changes that occurred
to the perimeter in the 1980s, through the deregulatory era of the
1990s and 2000s, and past the 2008 global financial crisis.
A. Revising the Perimeter
1. Non-Bank Banks
The consequences of this shift took a decade to become clear, thanks
to generous legacy provisions and an accommodative regulatory
stance toward BHC activities.107 In the 1980s, however, rising interest
rates created sharp pressure on both sides of the regulatory perimeter.
Banks and BHCs, still subject to interest rate caps, sought other nondeposit sources of revenue; thrifts and other non-bank financial firms,
recently relieved of such restrictions, competed aggressively for both
commercial and consumer clients; and commercial firms sought
cheaper sources of financing, without triggering federal regulation.108
The 1970 amendments created a common way to meet all of these
goals: the use of so-called “non-bank banks,” which either accepted

iterations of the BHC Act, but also “domestic building and loan or savings and loan
associations.” Id. § 101(e).
107 The grandfather clause allowed any activities lawfully conducted by a BHC as of
June 30, 1968 to continue for a decade. Id. § 103(1); Omarova & Tahyar, supra note
83, at 151 (citing Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking
and Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1569 (2007)). The lone exception to the relative
stability of the 1970s perimeter was the International Banking Act, which brought
foreign banking organizations under Federal Reserve supervision and allowed them
to secure national charters and deposit insurance. See Frank Anthony Misuraca,
Foreign Banking in the United States: An Objective Study of the International Banking
Act of 1978, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 539, 542–43 (1995).
108 The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980), established a six-year process for the phase-out of
interest-rate caps (under the auspices of a U.S. Treasury-led “Deregulatory
Committee”). It also standardized reserve requirements for both member and nonmember banks. Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 83, at 151-52. See also Kenneth J.
Robinson, Savings and Loan Crisis, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013); Paul R. Allen &
William T. Wilhelm, The Impact of the 1980 Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act on Market Value and Risk: Evidence from the Capital Markets,
20(3) J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 364, 366-67 (1988).
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demand deposits or made commercial loans—or (technically, at least)
did neither.109
The first major attempts to use this loophole came from outside the
regulatory perimeter, from commercial firms.110 In August 1980, the
OCC allowed the Gulf and Western Corporation, a Fortune 500 firm
with offerings from auto parts and sugar to oil and gas, to acquire
Fidelity National Bank, which had recently divested itself from
commercial loans and promised to make no others.111 By March 1981,
the Board ruled that Fidelity was not a bank and that Gulf and
Western was not a bank holding company; two years later, a similar
pattern followed, when the OCC and then Board conditionally allowed
a New York BHC to take demand deposits and make commercial loans
via its Florida trust company. 112 A wave of applications from both
BHCs and other holding companies followed—most focused on card,
consumer lending, and money market services—and the ranks and
size of non-bank banks increased sharply.113 Congress also pared back
the activity restrictions these institutions faced, by both easing federal
regulatory requirements and preempting state ones.114

109 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Financial Services: Information on
Nonbank Banks, GAO/GGD-86-46FS (Mar. 1986) [hereinafter GAO, Financial
Services].
110 But see Joe Mahon, Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, commonly called
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013) (detailing Board approvals of
“Sec. 20 subsidiaries” beginning in 1987).

The approval came shortly after Gulf and Western’s then-CEO Charles Bluhdorn
settled charges of accounting fraud with the SEC. Id.; William G. Blair, Charles D.
Bluhdorn, The Head of Gulf and Western, Dies at 56, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 1983).
111

112

GAO, Financial Services, supra note 109, at 4-5.

Before April 1, 1984, only 53 such applications had been filed with the OCC; from
April 1, 1984 to May 20, 1985, 388 were filed. Id. at 5. By 1987, 200 applications had
been granted, and another 200 were pending. The fastest growing of these was
Greenwood Trust Company of Delaware, affiliated with Sears, which increased its
deposits from $27 million to $1.05 billion in less than a year. Omarova & Tahyar,
supra note 83, at 152 (citing Robert E. Litan, WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO? 49 (1987)).
Among thrifts specifically, assets grew 56 percent from 1982 to 1985. GAO, supra note
109, at 5.
113

These measures allowed the use of checking-like non-demand deposit accounts
(such as NOW, Super NOW, and money-market deposit accounts), lifted certain limits
on thrift activities, and relaxed bank single-counterparty credit limits. Effective
capital requirements at thrift institutions, in particular, fell sharply from 1980 to
1982. Policymakers justified these measures by citing increased competition among
banks, changing technology, and high-interest-rate pressures on thrift institutions.
See F. Jean Wells, Congressional Research Service, Pub. L. No. 97-320, Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982: A Brief Explanation, Report 82-117 E
114
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The Board, as well as a growing number of small banks, began
working to close these loopholes on competitive, prudential, and
economic-development grounds. 115 In January 1984, the Board
reinterpreted the relevant terms in the BHC Act, defining a demand
deposit as a deposit that “as a matter of practice is payable on demand”
and a commercial loan as including a number of common “commercial
loan substitutes.” 116 As in the 1960s, litigation, public debate, 117
circumvention by the Comptroller’s office, 118 and defeat at the
Supreme Court followed. 119 Congress responded by passing the
Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA) of 1987, placing all FDICinsured institutions under the BHC Act’s definition of a “bank,” but
formally excluding a range of institutions, including every non-bank
bank that existed when the Act passed.120 The result was to sanction
the prior financial regulatory regime, rather than fundamentally
reform it, just as a wave of thrift institution failures began to crest.121

(May 10, 1983); NAT’L. COMM. ON FIN. INST. REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT,
Origins and Causes of the S&L Debacle: A Blueprint for Reform: A Report to the
President and Congress of the United States 35-36 (1993).
115

GAO, supra note 109, at 5.

116 Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial, 474 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1986) (citing 49
Fed. Reg. 794, 835-836 (1984)).
117 See, e.g., E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special? ann. rep., Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis (Jan. 1982); Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial, Oyez (last
visited Jan 4, 2021) (Michael Bradfield, for petitioner, arguing that 1970 amendments’
definition of banking included “combination” of commercial lending with production
of “instruments that are money”); Litan, supra note 113.
118 The OCC introduced a limited moratorium on the chartering of new non-bank
banks in April 1983, four months before approving the Florida application (from U.S.
Trust Corporation) referenced above. The Board finalized its revision to Regulation Y
in January 1984. In October, the Comptroller said he could wait no longer for
Congressional action, and ended the moratorium. GAO, supra note 109, at 7.
119 The Court struck down the new “demand deposit” definition on “step zero” Chevron
grounds. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). In
striking down the commercial loan definition, however, it held that a commercial loan
must “entail the face-to-face negotiation of credit between borrower and lender”; any
“extensions of credit in the open market that do not involve close borrower-lender
relationships” are not commercial loans. Dimension, 474 U.S. at 368.
120 Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 83, at 157; Competitive Equality Banking Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101, 101 Stat. 552 (1987).

Robinson, supra note 108 (citing Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987)).
121
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Fig. 4: The Federal Financial Regulatory Perimeter, Circa 2000
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2. The Rise of the Categorization Approach
Unlike in previous crises, reforms passed after the savings and loan
(S&L) crisis focused less on the conduct of financial institutions than
the conduct of regulators.122 Nevertheless, the late 1980s and early
1990s saw several perimeter changes beyond those of CEBA. The
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA) restored thrift activity restrictions, created a consolidated
regulator for state and federal thrifts, and moved thrift deposit
insurance (and the power to issue enforcement actions) to the FDIC.123
It created a new enforcement regime for “persons participating in the
conduct of the affairs” of a financial institution (i.e., institutionaffiliated persons), including consultants, independent contractors,
attorneys, and others prescribed by regulation. 124 The FDIC
Improvement Act of 1991 guaranteed the deposit insurer a veto over
any financial institution seeking insurance, including all national
banks and member banks. 125 It also narrowed the gap between
insured state and national banks, by limiting the former from

122 These include the new standards for setting and enforcing thrift accounting and
capital requirements, changes to financial institution supervisory ratings, and the
Prompt Corrective Action framework. For example, the FDIC Improvement Act, Pub.
L. No. 102-242, § 142(b), 105 Stat. 2236 (1991), made the Federal Reserve liable to the
FDIC for certain excess losses on discount window lending to critically
undercapitalized institutions. This approach also sharply increased the salience of
quantitative capital and liquidity requirements in federal prudential regulation. See
Provident, infra note 123, at S326, S330; George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman,
FDICIA After Five Years, 11(3) J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 144 (1997) (“Congress instead
sought to stiffen the backbone and reduce the discretion of regulators through a policy
that become known as ‘structured early intervention and resolution,’ or SEIR. . . .
SEIR appealed to both Congress and the administration in the early 1990s as a
politically feasible, quickly implementable and effective solution”).

The Act also increased some oversight of foreign bank offices in the United States,
and it took steps to increase coverage of state banks under federal deposit insurance,
without requiring such coverage. See Anthony C. Provident, Playing with FIRREA,
Not Getting Burned: Statutory Overview of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 59(6) FORDHAM L. REV. S323 (1991) (citing Pub.
L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, § 151, 202 et seq., 301, 303, 901 (1989)). A predecessor
study from the U.S. Treasury recommended more sweeping changes, including a
much broader range of permissible affiliate activities for both well-capitalized banks
and “financial services holding companies,” which Congress declined to pass. See
Michael P. Malloy, Financial Services Regulation: A Mid-Decade Review, 63 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2031, 2047-50 (1995).
123

124

Pub. L. No. 101-73, supra note 123, § 211.

125 FDIC, The Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s: Summary and
Implications, in HISTORY OF THE 90S, VOL. 1: AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES
OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S 12 (1997).
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engaging in activities and investments not permissible for the
latter.126
However, many regulatory measures in the 1990s served to push the
perimeter outwards—increasing the permissible activities of banks
and other regulated financial institutions—while restricting federal
oversight of those same activities. 127 In 1994, citing the benefits of
diversification after a series of regional economic downturns, Congress
lifted most restrictions on interstate branching and bank mergers.128
At the same time, it eased “operational and managerial” requirements
on certain bank holding companies, and it significantly increased
banks’ ability to acquire non-bank companies, use interlocking
managers or directors, engage in new non-bank activities, and
outsource bank services to non-bank third parties, even over
regulators’ objections.129 Meanwhile, the OCC extended banks’ ability
to offer insurance, annuities, and index-fund like products.130 It also
63 Fed. Reg. § 362.1; see also Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 303, 105 Stat. 2236, 2349 (1991).
126

This paragraph does not address significant rollbacks in the scope of consumer
protection statutes and derivatives oversight. See Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm.,
Securitization and Derivatives and Subprime Lending, in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 45-48, 76-78.
127

See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994). The Act’s main perimeter-relevant change was to
foreign bank regulation, allowing the Board and FDIC to condition approval of an
FBO branch or agency application on the FBO carrying out all U.S. banking activities
in a “domestic banking subsidiary.” Id. § 104(a).
128

With regard to outsourcing, the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994 amended the Bank Service Company (née Corporation) Act,
Pub. L. No. 87-856, § 5, 76 Stat. 1132 (1962) (as amended by the Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act, of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 709, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982))
to require notice to its primary Federal regulator of an insured bank investment in a
bank service corporation, rather than prior approval from such regulator. Pub. L. No.
103-325, § 318(c), 323, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994). For other provisions, see Economic
Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§
2208, 2210, 2612, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). The Board also gained substantial discretion
to approve foreign bank branches within the United States. Id. § 2214.
129

130 Several of these extensions rested on a 1916 provision (originally 12 U.S.C. § 92),
thought to have been repealed in 1918, that allowed any national bank located and
doing business in a place with a population of 5,000 or less to act as an agent for any
insurance company. In a 1993 decision, the Supreme Court held that § 92 remained
in effect, and that it did not constrain where such a bank could offer or perform such
agency services. U.S. Nat’l. Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439 (1993); see
also Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) (holding that § 92 preempts Florida
insurance law); Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 512 U.S.
251 (1995) (upholding OCC determination that sale of fixed, variable, and hybrid
annuities is incidental necessary power to business of banking authorized under 12
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pushed for the end of structural requirements and activity restrictions
that “depriv[ed] individual institutions of the freedom to choose how
to provide financial services.” 131 In Figure 4, for the first time,
regulated entities span these zones, reflecting the creation of
categories and regimes affecting both prudentially and functionally
regulated institutions.
The apex of this trend was the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 132 The
legislation repealed the required separation of securities and banking
activities that had been in place since the Depression.133 In part, this
action paved the way for a simpler system of broad, segmented, and
Board-supervised “financial holding companies” (FHCs)—whose nonbank affiliates could undertake almost any activity “financial in
nature,” but whose banking subsidiaries were limited to more
traditional functions. 134 However, the Act also ratified recent
U.S.C. 24); Investment Co. Inst. v. Ludwig, 884 F. Supp. 4 (1995) (upholding OCC
finding of stock index futures within scope of 12 U.S.C. 24). Other cases also
established near-exclusive OCC authority over national bank conduct, even as to state
laws. See, e.g., First Union Nat’l. Bank v. Burke, 48 F. Supp. 2d 132 (1999). Separately,
the court upheld looser restrictions on credit union eligibility. See Nat’l. Credit Union
Admin. v. First Nat’l. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998).
Reasons cited include changing consumer preferences in “an age of rapidly
changing communications and computer technology,” overall efficiency, a lack of
evidence of a bank funding advantage over other financial services firms, and “the
needs of consumers, poor people, and small businesses.” Eugene A. Ludwig,
Statement Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities and Government
Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of
Representatives (Mar. 5, 1997). The OCC also introduced a special-purpose charter
program, on which it would later elaborate; see OCC, Rules, Policies, and Procedures
for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60342 (Nov. 27, 1996).
131

Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). This paragraph omits a concurrent
debate over derivatives regulation, beginning with a 1997 SEC proposal to create a
new status of “OTC derivatives dealer” subject to a form of limited broker-dealer
regulations. The CFTC responded with a “concept release” considering whether OTC
derivatives were covered under the Commodity Exchange Act; Congress enjoined and
eventually overruled this possibility in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000); Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63
Fed. Reg. 26,114 (May 12, 1998); OTC Derivatives Dealers, Net Capital Rule, 63 Fed.
Reg. 59,632 (Jan. 4, 1999).
132

133

Id. § 101.

The Act permits firms to engage in any activity “financial in nature, or incidental
to such activity; or is complementary to a financial activity and does not pose a
substantial risk to the safety and soundness of depository institutions or the financial
system generally,” as defined in regulation. (Merchant banking activities were, for a
time, excluded.) The Act also includes a long and expansive list of such activities,
including “lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or safeguarding
money or securities,” providing advisory services, making a market in securities, and
generally doing anything “usual” in connection with the activities of BHCs anywhere
134
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expansions in agency and judicial interpretations of the “business of
banking”; gave the OCC and FDIC expanded powers to limit or
approve bank activities, while restricting the Board’s supervision of
BHC and FHC subsidiaries; and created new regulatory categories
that narrowly prescribed oversight of certain financial products.135 It
also expanded the scope of permissible activities that national banks
themselves could undertake via “financial subsidiaries.” 136 The
resulting legislation not only sanctioned several elements of thencurrent industry practice, but also deepened the permissible ties
between banking, commerce, and other financial services.137
This trend continued for the following decade, as firms continued to
consolidate and diversify within the larger and more permeable
regulatory perimeter. 138 In the meantime, external pressure on the
perimeter also mounted. 139 One well-catalogued source was the
abroad. Id. § 103. The Board had authority to determine the scope of such activities
for FHCs, subject to a veto by the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. However, in
determining the scope of such activities for national banks, see infra note 136, the
roles were reversed, with Treasury making the determination subject to a Board veto.
Id. § 121.
135 See, e.g., id. §§ 104, 113-15, 121, 201, 205. Other examples abound. Though the
authors have not taken a full tally, new categories introduced include FHCs,
investment bank holding companies, financial subsidiaries, hybrid products,
identified banking products, insurance subsidiaries and affiliates, mutual
redomesticated and redomesticating insurers, licensed insurance producers, and ATM
fund operators.
136 Id. § 121. While treating said subsidiaries as affiliates for purposes of inter-affiliate
transaction limits, the Act nonetheless exempts certain covered transactions between
the bank and any financial subsidiary.

Few provisions of the Act addressed commercial activities directly, even in light of
the new “incidental” and “complementary” activity provisions, supra note 134. But see
id. § 103 (imposing restrictions on grandfathered commercial activities, and requiring
report with “analysis and discussion of the risks posed by commercial activities of
financial holding companies to the safety and soundness of affiliate depository
institutions”); id. § 401 (preventing “creation of new S&L holding companies with
commercial affiliates”).
137

138 Significant exceptions remain in the expansion of public-company-audit and antimoney-laundering/counter-terrorist-financing requirements. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).

See also Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Bank Activities
and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 6363 (proposed
Feb. 7, 2003) (proposing a “special purpose national bank that limits its activities to
fiduciary activities or to any other activities within the business of banking”); Rules,
Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Bank Activities and Operations;
Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 70, 122 (Jan. 16, 2004) (narrowing
proposal to firms that “conduct at least one of the following core banking functions:
“(1) receiving deposits; (2) paying checks; or (3) lending money”).
139
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“shadow banking system,” a disaggregated network of market-based
financial intermediaries, distanced but not divorced from public-sector
support, that accumulated trillions more in liabilities by 2007 than
the formal banking system itself. 140 Another source was the ILC, a
consumer-lending charter status that dated to the early 20th century,
which the original BHC Act and Federal Deposit Insurance (FDI) Act
excluded from their definitions of “bank.”141
Until the late 1980s, ILCs primarily made small loans to industrial
workers and were not generally permitted to accept deposits. 142 In
1987, however, CEBA exempted the parent companies of even FDICinsured ILCs from holding-company supervision.143 As demand for the
ILC charter grew, states also expanded ILC powers to be nearly
identical to those of a bank.144 By 2006, ILCs had grown from $4.2
billion in assets to $213 billion; a number of large financial firms had
chartered ILCs of their own; and several commercial firms had sought
to do the same.145 When Walmart requested an ILC charter from the
140 This

trend includes significant growth in secondary market activity, largely outside
the regulatory perimeter, including growth in the total notional derivatives volume
from roughly $70 trillion in 2001 to $445 trillion in 2007. Alan S. Blinder, AFTER THE
MUSIC STOPPED (2013), at 64. As this history has been the subject of recent and
extensive scholarship, it is not covered in detail here. See, e.g., Zoltan Poszar, Tobias
Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, & Hayley Boesky, Shadow Banking, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y
REV. (Dec. 2013), at 6 (estimating shadow bank liabilities at $22 trillion, versus
traditional banking liabilities at $14 trillion).
In 1938, 31 states offered some type of ILC charter; only 16 of these states
permitted ILCs to accept deposits. See Raymond J. Saulnier, INDUSTRIAL BANKING
COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRACTICES (1940); Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 83,
at 158.
141

142 Testimony of Scott G. Alvarez to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Oct. 4, 2007). See also Statement of Martin J. Gruenberg to the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, Chairman, FDIC (July 13, 2016).
143 Specifically, CEBA exempts an ILC from the definition of a “bank” if: (1) the ILC
is chartered by a state eligible to issue industrial bank charters; (2) the charter is from
a state that required FDIC insurance on March 5, 1987; and (3) the ILC meets at least
one of three conditions: (i) the ILC does not accept demand deposits; (2) the ILC has
less than $10 million in assets; or (3) the ILC has not been acquired by another
company since August 10, 1987. CEBA, supra note 114; 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H).
144

Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 83, at 161-62.

145 Much of the growth was from the transfer of uninsured brokerage customer
deposits to corresponding ILCs, and specifically, of American Express’s credit card
operations to a separate Utah-chartered ILC. Parent Companies of Industrial Banks
and Industrial Loan Companies, 86 Fed. Reg. 10,703 (Feb. 23, 2021). Other financial
institutions with ILCs included Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and
Lehman Brothers. Large commercial firms that obtained ILC charters included
General Electric, General Motors, Sears, Target, and Harley-Davidson. James R.
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FDIC, public opposition emerged from a mix of small banks, grocery
stores, labor unions, consumer and community groups, and realtors.
The FDIC responded by imposing a moratorium on new ILCs and
proposing a number of legislative changes; a legislative moratorium
followed, and the FDIC did not approve another ILC application until
March 2020.146
B. Today’s Perimeter
The 2008 financial crisis revealed the consequences of these trends—
of diversification and consolidation inside the regulatory perimeter,
sharp growth in financial activities outside the perimeter, and deeper
ties between the two. Risk that was nominally contained to the nonbanking sector, or to the non-banking portions of consolidated
financial firms, accrued instead to banking organizations, the public
purse, and the broader economy. 147 The U.S. legislative response
expanded the regulatory perimeter to cover many sources of this risk,
from secondary-market activity, to consumer lending, to certain nonbank financial firms, the last of which regulators now had the
authority to designate as “systemically important.”148
In substance, the Dodd-Frank Act deviated materially from financial
reform of the prior 30 years. In method, it was consistent with the
categorization approach embodied in most financial reform efforts
since the S&L crisis. The Act incorporated the definitions of “bank,”
“bank holding company,” “depository institution,” and more than 50
other categories of regulated entity without amendment. 149 It
introduced more than 80 others, increasing the number of such

Barth et al., Industrial Loan Companies: Supporting America’s Financial System,
Milken Institute (Apr. 2011), at 4.
146 Following the failure or severe distress of a number of these financial firms during
the 2008 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act established another, temporary
moratorium on ILCs. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 603, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also GAO,
Characteristics and Regulation of Exempt Institutions and the Implications of
Removing the Exemptions, GAO-12-160 (Jan. 2012) (describing ILC transformation
from “a class of small, limited-purpose institutions” to “a diverse group of insured
institutions with a variety of business lines”).
147 For a discussion of several examples and the federal response, see, e.g., First
Responders: Inside the U.S. Strategy for Fighting the 2007-2009 Global Financial
Crisis (Ben S. Bernanke, Timothy F. Geithner, and Henry M. Paulson, Jr. with J.
Nellie Liang, eds., 2020).
148 E.g.,
149

Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 146, Titles I, VII, X, 124 Stat. 1391, 1641, 1955.

Id., § 2 at 1386.
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categories in federal law by more than a fifth. Separately, it
established new standards for prudential oversight and conduct
regulation, while limiting the discretion of regulators in implementing
those standards. 150 The three major pieces of financial regulatory
legislation passed since then have followed a similar approach.151
The resulting federal financial regulatory perimeter, shown in Figure
5, is broader, more complex, and arguably more permeable than at any
point in its history. It contains several hundred statutory categories,
each conferring its own mix of rights and obligations—some requiring
the formation of a specific legal entity, others requiring public
registration, disclosure, or supervision, still others requiring some
form of chartering with prior government consent. Almost any entity
or legal person offering financial services typically falls under one or
several of these categories, triggering at least some kind of public
oversight. Conversely, however, by tailoring the scope of its activities
and its legal form, a careful firm can choose some forms of regulation
over others. Critically, regulators have authority to keep firms inside
the perimeter from venturing into commercial territory, but much less
authority to police “breaches” from the outside in.

150 This is particularly true of foreign banking organizations (FBOs). The Dodd-Frank
Act required certain institutions to form and conduct certain activities via
“intermediate holding companies,” subject to a broader range of prudential
requirements. Many FBOs responded by shifting assets and activity to branches,
which were preserved under the new statutory measures. See Jeremy C. Kress,
Domesticating Foreign Finance, 73 FLORIDA L. REV. (forthcoming); see also Nicholas
K. Tabor, Trust But Verify: Domestic Politics and International Coordination in U.S.
Post-Crisis Financial Regulatory Policy, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 889 (2018).
151 See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018); Insurance Capital Standards Clarification Act of
2014, Pub. L. No. 113-279, 128 Stat. 3017 (2014); An Act to enhance the ability of
community financial institutions to foster economic growth and serve their
communities, boost small businesses, increase individual savings, and for other
purposes, Pub. L. No. 113-250, 128 Stat. 2886 (2014).
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Fig. 5: The Federal Financial Regulatory Perimeter, Circa 2022
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Part III. Lessons for Today’s Financial Regulators
Using the analysis presented in Parts I and II, we now present four
lessons that history holds for the perimeter challenges of today. 152
These insights may prove useful to lawmakers and financial
regulators who are currently crafting the next iteration of the
regulatory perimeter to deal with the rapid growth of FinTech
competitors.
A. Porous and Dynamic
First, the United States has always had a legal perimeter separating
“banking” from “commerce.” That perimeter has always been porous
and it has never been static.
The early American perimeter derived from banks’ public purpose—
not just as legislatively chartered entities, but also as a source of
economic rents and fiscal support. The goal of this separation was not
to protect banking from commerce, but to ensure that banking served
commerce adequately, providing financing for public infrastructure
and other preferred projects. As such, governments placed these early
banks on one side of a porous perimeter, with a close relationship to
commercial activity.
This direct fiscal role has faded over time, but the permeable, shifting
nature of the perimeter has not. The territory between banking and
commerce has always been large and contested, with the areas under
financial regulators’ jurisdiction changing with the politics and law of
the time. Over time, Congress has also recognized other benefits
associated with separating banking and commerce, including
protection against concentration of economic power and conflicts of
interest. The particulars differ, but the debates seeking to define and
capture these benefits are as old as the nation itself. Perimeter
changes are natural, and there is helpful, clarifying precedent for even
the most novel, idiosyncratic challenges. To understand those
challenges, it is important to understand what’s old about them, not
just what's new.

152 The analysis presented in this Part is based on our previous working paper:
Alexandros Vardoulakis, Asad Kudiya, Byoung Hwa Hwang, Courtney Demartini,
Dan McGonegle, Gavin Smith, Jess Cheng, Katherine E. Di Lucido, Kathy Wilson,
Jeffery Y. Zhang, Joseph Cox, Mary L. Watkins, Meg Donovan, Nicholas K. Tabor,
Nick Ehlert & Stacey L. Schreft, Lessons from the History of the U.S. Regulatory
Perimeter, FEDS Note (Oct. 15, 2021).
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B. Pressure from All Sides
Second, challenges to the perimeter often follow a common pattern—
starting with outside-in pressure, followed by inside-out pressure, and
frequently culminating in crisis.
Disputes about the scope of federal banking regulation are historically
specific. However, a typical pattern has emerged of push and pull,
between institutions and the agencies and jurisdictions that regulate
them. When the perimeter buckles, it typically starts with pressure
from less well-regulated firms—that is, from the outside in.
Outside-in pressure. Firms outside the regulatory perimeter—
sometimes, but not always, with a commercial presence—enter into
more direct competition with firms inside it, offering the services of a
regulated bank while avoiding most or all of its requirements.
Engaging in this regulatory arbitrage permits firms to traverse the
perimeter, often increasing the ties between banking and commerce
and eroding the value of a bank charter.
In the early Republic and free banking era, this “outside-in pressure”
came from merchant banks, utilities, and other firms with the capacity
to engage in “monied transactions or operations.” In the early dual
banking era, it came from state-chartered banks, which shifted to
deposit-taking and check-issuance after the introduction of a federal
tax on note issuance. In the late 19th and early 20th century, it came
from trust companies, expanding beyond their traditional custody
business; before the Depression, from the widespread and explosive
growth in securities lending; after the war, from several stripes of
holding companies, conglomerates, and “congenerics”; and later, from
“non-bank banks,” money market funds, industrial loan companies
(ILCs), and other forms of “shadow banking.”
Inside-out pressure. Firms inside the regulatory perimeter typically
respond to this pressure by advocating regulation of their non-bank
competitors and straining at the fetters on their own conduct.
Regulated firms form new partnerships, create new products, convert
to new charters, or lobby for changes to disadvantageous regulatory
requirements. They find allies in commercial firms, as well as in
competing regulators and jurisdictions. They argue that restrictions
are arbitrary, restraining innovation and unnecessarily marking
certain acceptable activities as unsafe; or, if not, that they push
conduct beyond the reach of regulation. In either case, they argue
these restrictions place regulated firms at a disadvantage, imperiling
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their safety and soundness, the integrity of the financial system, and
overall economic growth.
These arguments are most familiar from the universal banking
debates of the 1990s and shadow banking debates of the 2010s.
However, they date to at least the late 19th century, figuring
especially prominently into regulatory actions during the late 1920s,
late 1960s, and early 1980s. Accounts of changing technology have
figured in much of this discourse.
Reform and expansion—by devil or disaster. Pressure on the perimeter
can culminate in action, either by crisis, scandal, or both. In response
to this pressure, regulators, legislators, and industry act to patch or
expand the perimeter—often while letting existing institutions
operate under legacy treatment—or increase permissible activities in
exchange for increased regulation. In turn, this can lead to political
action to redefine the perimeter, move it, or patch up its holes. The
actors involved can vary, and often include Congress, banks, and
regulators themselves. With few exceptions, the effect is to push the
perimeter outward, extending it to at least some set of firms and
activities not previously within regulators’ jurisdiction.
A consistent set of arguments often recur during a perimeter
expansion: that unregulated or under-regulated activities create
moral hazard, posing a threat to the core banking sector, financial
stability, and the public purse; that uneven regulation is inequitable,
capricious, or even corrupt; or that a flimsy perimeter fosters
monopoly, giving large commercial firms an unfair economic
advantage. They figured in the Pujo Committee’s “money trust”
investigation, the Pecora Commission hearings, the mid-century Bank
Holding Company Act debates, and the recent ILC discussions. Where
a crisis is absent, a salient case often suffices—J.P. Morgan in the
1910s, Transamerica in the late 1940s and early 1950s, DuPont in the
1960s, Travelers/Citibank in the 1990s, and Walmart in the early
2000s.
C. Because You Do, You Are; And Because You Are, You Do
Third, the core architecture of the U.S. regulatory perimeter is simpler
than some current debates suggest.
Contemporary discussions often draw a distinction between “entitybased” and “activity-based” approaches to financial regulation. In an
entity-based system, regulators have jurisdiction over certain
categories of legal persons. In an activity-based system, regulators
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have jurisdiction based on what a legal person does, like making loans
or dealing in securities. Throughout history, however, this distinction
has obscured more than it has clarified. In the U.S. context, it is
largely a red herring.
Congress often confers regulatory jurisdiction, and defines positive
grants and negative restrictions, by creating a set of categories (e.g.,
“bank,” “credit union,” “Federal Reserve member,” “deposit broker”).
Those categories might be based on a mix of entity- and activity-based
factors. They can capture a wide range of legal persons and
arrangements, both formal and informal—and very often, they can
require that an activity take place only within a particular type of
organizational structure. For example, an institution might be a
“depository institution” because it holds a certain type of “bank”
charter.153 It might hold that charter, in turn, because of the specific
business it conducts or hopes to conduct, such as taking deposits.154 It
might conduct that business, in turn, because it is closely related to
another aspect of its business, like lending.155
A rough and ready rule captures this relationship, which fits much of
the last 150 years of federal financial law: Because you do, you are;
and because you are, you do.
Until quite recently, the bank regulatory perimeter was determined
by the second part of this rule: because you are, you do. In other words,
only properly chartered banks could engage in the business of
banking, and regulators had the power to limit what and how they did
that. Technological advances have enabled nonbanks to “do” many
parts of the traditional banking bundle—to facilitate payments, hold
deposits, and extend credit—thus shifting the focus to the first part of
the phrase: because you do, you are.156
D. Increased Complexity in the Modern Era: The Categorization
Approach to Perimeter Design

153 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(A)(i) (defining “depository institution” to include
“insured bank”).
154 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) (defining “insured bank” by reference to “bank”),
1813(a)(1) (defining “bank” to include “State bank”), 1813(a)(2) (defining “State bank”
to include “any bank . . . which is engaged in the business of receiving deposits . . . .”).
155 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 378(a)(2) (prohibiting receipt of deposits, unless a person is (i)
specifically authorized to do so under federal or state law and (ii) subject to
examination and regulation).
156

Hsu, supra note 1, at 6.
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Fourth, nearly 40 years ago, Congress made an important and
enduring shift in regulatory design. Over time, this shift has made the
perimeter significantly more complex.
The federal perimeter began to take shape in 1791, with the
introduction of the term “bank” in the organic statute of the Bank of
the United States.157 Over the next 230 years, Congress extended the
perimeter, by adding new regulatory categories that defined new
rights and responsibilities. Each change was typically a response to a
specific challenge, like a new product or service, a new legal entity
structure, or a new cross-jurisdictional or cross-border issue. Their
cumulative effect was to make the perimeter more complex—as
agencies formed and dissolved, new categories incorporated or
supplanted others, and the boundaries between core prudential
supervision and more functional approaches emerged and blurred.
However, this pattern has not been static. Instead, a significant shift
occurred almost 40 years ago—to a new approach to regulatory design,
and a different allocation of responsibility between Congress and the
regulatory agencies. This new approach did not diminish the
perimeter's mounting complexity; it accelerated it.
Before the 1980s, debates about the placement and shape of the
perimeter typically focused on the meaning and scope of existing
regulatory categories—for example, which activities should define the
“business of banking,” which entities should qualify as “banks” (or
“bank holding companies”), or what should qualify as a “deposit.” In
this earlier era, those broad terms set the rough outer bounds of
regulators’ jurisdiction, within relatively concise statutes. Within
those bounds, agencies had substantial discretion to oversee the
conduct of supervised institutions, subject to public input through
measures like notice-and-comment rulemaking. This approach made
the perimeter more responsive and resilient to changing industry
practices.
Over the course of the 1980s, however, Congress’s approach to the
perimeter changed. By the decade’s end, financial regulatory
legislation typically maintained the existing statutory definitions of
“banking,” “deposits,” “securities,” and other key terms. Instead,
reform legislation most often created new, sometimes overlapping sets
of regulatory categories—extending federal oversight, not just to new
An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States, Ch. 1-10
(Feb. 25, 1791).
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institutions, but also to new categories of institutions, charters, and
activities. At the same time, Congress reduced agencies’ discretion in
the exercise of such oversight. Reform legislation described the
restrictions each type of institution should and should not face, in
extensive and unprecedented statutory detail.
This trend arguably began to crest with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
in 1999 (which introduced roughly 30 new regulatory categories), but
it persisted in both the Dodd-Frank Act (which incorporated more
than 50 existing categories without amendment and introduced over
80 new ones) and the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and
Consumer Protection Act (which introduced 18 more categories,
repealing none).
The United States has embraced this “categorization” approach
through several turns of the credit cycle, in periods of both
deregulation and re-regulation. During that time, it has experienced
(arguably) four financial crises, attributable to factors both internal
and external to the financial system. In each case, important firms,
activities, and other sources of the stress were outside the regulatory
perimeter, compounding fragility inside it. In each case, regulators
lacked clear, well-resourced, plenary authority to oversee those firms
and activities. In each case, a period of reform followed, aimed at
restoring or improving the perimeter's integrity. And in each case, the
reforms followed the same broad approach as the time before.
Today, the resulting federal financial regulatory perimeter is broader,
more complex, and arguably more permeable than at any point in its
history. It contains several hundred statutory categories, each
conferring its own mix of rights and obligations—some requiring the
formation of a specific legal entity, others requiring public
registration, disclosure, or supervision, still others requiring some
form of chartering with prior government consent. Almost any entity
or legal person offering financial services typically falls under one or
several of these categories, triggering at least some kind of public
oversight. Conversely, however, by tailoring the scope of its activities
and its legal form, a careful firm can choose some forms of regulation
over others. And critically, while the current regulatory perimeter
keeps firms inside it from “venturing outside” to engage in commercial
activity, it lacks the same ability to keep firms outside the perimeter
from “venturing in”—to engage in bank-like activity, without banklike regulation and supervision.
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Conclusion
Today’s financial regulatory perimeter faces a variety of challenges
and pressures. As discussed in this Article, we have witnessed the
“unbundling” and “re-bundling” of the traditional banking business;
the growth of stablecoins, stored-value platforms, and other new
technologies; the entry of commercial firms into the financial services
space; and the advent of new financial services charters, with new
uses for old ones.
The proliferation of these new financial products outside of the
regulatory perimeter has immense consequences for the stability of
our financial system as well as the economic well-being of regular
individuals.158 Take stablecoins like Tether, for instance. The issuers
of most stablecoins claim that their coins are backed by cash and safe
assets, are pegged to a fiat currency like the U.S. dollar, and are
redeemable on demand. From the perspective of economic theory,
stablecoin issuers are functionally equivalent to unregulated banks.
Not surprisingly, stablecoin issuers are vulnerable to bank runs. In
May 2022, the decline in the price of Bitcoin and the death spiral of
the algorithmic stablecoin, TerraUSD, were enough to knock some
stablecoins off their pegs. Tether holders withdrew $7 billion during
the panic.159
Lawmakers who wish to improve our financial regulatory framework
can learn from the lessons presented in this Article. Importantly,
strengthening the perimeter also requires understanding and
addressing pressures from at least three distinct angles.
Outside-in pressure. First, firms outside the perimeter enter into more
direct competition with firms inside it, offering the services of a
regulated bank while avoiding most or all of its requirements.
Inside-out pressure. Second, firms inside the perimeter respond to this
pressure by advocating regulation of their non-bank competitors.
Regulated firms form new partnerships, create new products, convert
to new charters, or lobby for changes to disadvantageous regulatory

158 See, e.g., Alexander Osipovich & Caitlin Ostroff, TerraUSD Crash Led to Vanished
Savings, Shattered Dreams, WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 27, 2022) (“A surgeon in
Massachusetts can’t stop thinking about how he lost his family’s nest egg. A young
Ukrainian considered suicide after losing 90% of his savings.”).

Scott Chipolina, Investors Pull $7bn from Tether As Stablecoin Jitters Intensify,
FINANCIAL TIMES (May 17, 2022).
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requirements. They find allies in commercial firms, as well as in
competing regulators and jurisdictions.
Reform and expansion. Third, pressure on the perimeter can
culminate in action. In response, regulators, legislators, and industry
act to reform the perimeter—often while letting existing institutions
operate under legacy treatment—or increase permissible activities in
exchange for increased regulation.
Here, in all likelihood, past is prologue. If the regulatory perimeter
remains in its current form or continues to expand along its recent
historical trend, we will see the continued proliferation and growth of
financial institutions in the regulatory gray area. Half a decade ago,
the market capitalization of the FinTech industry was substantially
lower that of the traditional banking industry, and the total market
capitalization of all cryptocurrencies was around $100 billion. Today,
the largest FinTech firms rival those of the largest banks, and the
market capitalization of cryptocurrencies has soared into the
trillions.160
The 2008 global financial crisis taught us many important lessons,
including the need to have large, systemically important financial
institutions be regulated and supervised. That cannot happen if the
perimeter is essentially a series of fenceposts without a fence.

160

See Hsu, supra note 1, at 1-2.
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Appendix
Figure A1 provides a visual illustration of this disaggregation and, in
some cases, reaggregation of the business of banking.161
Fig. A1: The Disaggregation and Reaggregation
of the Business of Banking

161 Kabbage, which provides funding directly to small businesses and customers
through an automated lending platform, originated at the intersection of deposittaking and lending; SoFi, which transacts in student loan refinancing, mortgages,
credit cards, and insurance, was similarly situated. Both Kabbage and SoFi migrated
into the financial regulatory perimeter after emerging on its edges: Kabbage was
acquired by American Express, a bank holding company, and SoFi recently became a
bank holding company after acquiring a small bank.
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